

JPRS 77000

15 December 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2233

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

15 December 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2233

CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Jordanian Minister Responds to Journalists on Arab Summit (AL-DUSTUR, 27 Nov 80).....	1
Briefs	
Syrian-Jordanian Talks	3

AFGHANISTAN

Guerrilla Activities in Kabul, Herat Reported (THE MUSLIM, 23 Nov 80).....	4
Soviets Lose Control of Southern Afghan Border (THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 19 Nov 80).....	5
President Karmal's Activities Reported (THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 21 Nov 80).....	6
Wrapup on Mujahideen Activities (THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 18 Nov 80).....	7
Air Activity Around Kabul Stepped Up (THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 21 Nov 80).....	8
Kashendi Falls to Mujahideen (THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 22 Nov 80).....	10
Briefs	
Soviet, Afghan Officials Killed	11
Soviet Forces Fighting Mujahids	11
Big Soviet Offensive	11

ALGERIA

Long-Term Economic Development Discussed (Jamal Salih; AL-SHA'B, 26 Oct 80).....	12
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

BAHRAIN

Authorities Allow Exempt Company To Proceed With Share Issue (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 10 Nov 80).....	16
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

Briefs

Stockpiling Hits Shipyard Bookings	17
War Holds Up Shipments	17
Iron Pellet Plant	17

EGYPT

Military Towns Built To House Army Personnel (Faruq al-Shadhili; AL-AKHBAR, 1 Aug 80).....	19
Development Within Armed Forces Signal Corps Reviewed (Hamdi Lutfi; AL-MUSAWWAR, 22 Aug 80).....	20
Public Prosecutor Agency Reorganized (AL-AHRAM, 4 Aug 80).....	25

ISRAEL

Committee Approves Jerusalem Construction Plan (IDF Radio, 3 Dec 80).....	27
Sharon on Settlement Issue, Riots, Weizman (Ari'el Sharon Interview; Jerusalem Domestic Service, 29 Nov 80).....	29
Chief of Staff on Budget Cuts, Eastern Border (Yo'el Marcus; HA'ARETZ, 27 Nov 80).....	32
Small Israeli Political Factions Against Early Elections (MA'ARIV, 24 Nov 80).....	34
Poll Shows Majority Against Early Elections (MA'ARIV, 1 Dec 80).....	35
Public Opinion Poll on Leading Political Teams (YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 28 Nov 80).....	38
Poll Shows Support for Likud Down to 14 Percent (MA'ARIV, 21 Nov 80).....	39
Public Opinion Poll on Israeli Arabs Image (HA'ARETZ, 24 Nov 80).....	43
Poll on Hurvitz Popularity, Economic Situation (MA'ARIV, 30 Nov 80).....	45

Poll Shows Support for Settlement Has Doubled (Hanokh Smith; MA'ARIV, 28 Nov 80).....	49
Banned Arab Nazareth Conference Discussed (Yo'el Dar; DAVAR, 3 Dec 80).....	53
Briefs	
Border Police Stationed at Negev	55
Nazareth Rally Intentions	55
Saudis Behind Turkish Decision	55
Spray Used Against Demonstrators	56
Arab Emigration Decreasing	56
France Competing for Aircraft Purchase	56
Southern Sinai Development Continues	57
13 Seats for Dayan-Led Faction	57
Population Figures	57
Soviet Dropouts	57
Unemployment in November	57
Judaea, Samaria Clinics	58
Coal Deposits	58
Data on Exports	58
New KFIR Model	58
Additional Land for Settlements	58
JORDAN	
Briefs	
Cabinet Reshuffle Predicted	59
KUWAIT	
Briefs	
New London Purchase	60
New Power Plant	60
Visit Ban	60
Desalination Plans	60
Refinery Bids	61
LEBANON	
Political, Military Conflict Said To Be Imminent (Nahad al-Mashnuq; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 11-17 Aug 80).....	62
President's Speech on Army Day Analyzed (Rafiq Shallala; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 11-17 Aug 80).....	67

MOROCCO

IAEA Assistance Needed for Country's Nuclear Program (MAROC SOIR, 1 Oct 80).....	70
Report on Shale Oil Outlook (LA VIE ECONOMIQUE, 17 Oct 80).....	73
Trade Balance for First Half of 1980 (LA VIE ECONOMIQUE, 3 Oct 80).....	77
Morocco To Create Posts for Commercial Attaches (MAROC SOIR, 15 Oct 80).....	79
Briefs New Sugar Refinery	81

OMAN

Official Is Optimistic of Rich Oil Reserves (KUWAIT TIMES, 5 Nov 80).....	82
Rural Bias in New Five-Year Plan Reported (THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY, 22 Nov 80).....	83

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Joint YSP-DFLP Communique Published (AL-THAWRI, 25 Oct 80).....	84
--------------------------------------------------------------------	----

PERSIAN GULF AREA

Gulf States, Turkey Sign Oil Accord (KUWAIT TIMES, 10 Nov 80).....	89
First Contracts Awarded for Petrochemical Complex (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 10 Nov 80).....	90

QATAR

Briefs New Refinery	91
New Banking Measures	91

SAUDI ARABIA

Scientific Cooperation With France Noted (Ahmad Shaaban; KUWAIT TIMES, 13 Nov 80).....	92
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Insurance Trade Hit by War (KUWAIT TIMES, 6 Nov 80).....	93
-------------------------------------------------------------	----

WESTERN SAHARA

Morocco Perceives Algerian Change of Attitude on Sahara (LE SOLEIL, 6 Nov 80).....	94
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

JORDANIAN MINISTER RESPONDS TO JOURNALISTS ON ARAB SUMMIT

JN260920 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 27 Nov 80 pp 1, 19

[Excerpts] Amman--Information Minister 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah met yesterday evening with journalists and correspondents of local, Arab and international news agencies, television and radio stations and discussed with them the third meeting of the 11th Arab Summit Conference, which was held under the chairmanship of His Majesty King Husayn at the Royal Cultural Center yesterday evening.

The information minister then answered questions posed by the journalists. In reply to a question, he said that the conference yesterday unanimously approved the pan-Arab Economic Charter, after this charter was endorsed by a four-member committee comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Iraq. Abu 'Awdah added that this charter will be signed by the Arab leaders during today's final session.

In response to a question about whether there was an intention of forming an Arab committee to visit the Arab states which did not attend the summit, he said that no specific decision has been reached to this effect.

Asked about the African Development Fund, Abu 'Awdah said that this fund was established for the purpose of achieving Arab participation in the development and economic backing of the African states.

The minister expressed his sorrow over the boycotting by some Arab states of the 11th Arab Summit Conference, adding that previous Arab summit conferences were not attended by all.

The minister pointed out that since the conference was attended by the Arab majority, it represents the Arab nation's desire and will, which would thus guarantee the effectiveness of the decisions reached by the conference.

In reply to a question on the stand of the states participating in the Amman summit in regard to the Iraqi-Iranian war, the minister said that it was affirmed that the Arabs would confront any aggression against any Arab territory.

The minister stated that the political resolutions of the conference stressed the importance of the Baghdad and Tunis summit resolutions. Abu 'Awdah pointed out that the necessity was also stressed for continuing dialogue with the world states and all their groups, including the European group.

In reply to another question on whether the conference discussed the issue of southern Lebanon, the minister said that the place accorded this matter was similar to that devoted to it at the Tunis summit.

Replying to a question on the procedures adopted with regard to preserving the achievements of the Amman summit, Abu 'Awdah said: I do not believe that the stands of the states which boycotted the conference will affect the results of the summit, particularly since these states participated in laying down the program joint political action and the economic papers--with the exception of the paper on the decade of development--during the foreign ministers conference.

Replying to a question on the purpose behind massing the Syrian forces along the border near Jordan, Abu 'Awdah said: We do not know if these concentrations of troops are against Jordan. We believe that the purpose behind massing these troops is to bolster the Syrian forces, in order to confront Israel in the Golan.

The minister affirmed that the Arab states which implemented their commitment to bolster the steadfastness of our people in the occupied territory will continue to bolster this steadfastness. The minister pointed out that the states which abandoned the bolstering of steadfastness from the first moment were Libya and Algeria.

Replying to a question on the PLO's boycott of the Amman summit and the effect such a boycott would have on its cooperation with Jordan, Abu 'Awdah said: I do not believe that the non-attendance of the PLO will be a reason for non-cooperation with Jordan, since such cooperation has gone beyond the stage of dialogue. I hope that the non-attendance of the PLO will not affect cooperation in such a way that it deters the bolstering of our people's steadfastness in the occupied territory.

Concerning the reason the PLO did not participate in the conference, the information minister said that there are two aspects to the issue: the first represents the stand declared by the PLO and the memorandum it addressed to the general secretariat, in which it attempted to give the reasons for not attending the conference. The second is what we all know about the PLO position, which is set forth by the PLO leaders during the convocation of the meetings of the seven-member committee and of the foreign ministers conference. This clearly shows that they did not attend due to pressure.

On Arab moves in the international arena, the minister affirmed that such moves will continue and include all international groups, particularly those groups which influence the course of events in the Middle East region.

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

SYRIAN-JORDANIAN TALKS--Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad has invited Jordan's King Husayn for an official visit to Damascus to discuss all the contentious issues. The invitation was transmitted to Husayn through Saudi Deputy Prime Minister Prince 'Abdallah who ended a mediation mission yesterday. Among the problems the Syrians wish to raise during the talks with Husayn is also the development of Jordanian-Iraqi relations. The Syrians have revealed increased queasiness in view of the fact that Jordan is currently the chief means of supply for the Iraqi Army and economy following the blockade of the Iraqi sea outlet on the Persian Gulf. The Syrians will also want to discuss what is termed "the future of the Jordanian-Syrian cooperation." The evaluation is that Damascus will try to harm Husayn's maneuvering space in the Arab world and limit his independence. [Excerpt] [TA040852 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Dec 80 pp 1, 2]

CSO: 4805

GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN KABUL, HERAT REPORTED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 23 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] NEW DELHI, Nov. 22: Islamic freedom fighters have so far killed several Soviet and Afghan officials in Kabul in recent weeks, Afghan and diplomatic sources said today. Unknown assassins are reported to have killed the principal of a junior high school, and assassinated an Afghan official outside the Ministry of Education this week, diplomats said.

Officials in Kabul, however, did not know whether the assassins of the two men, belonged to President Karmal's Parcham party or were members of the opposing Khalq party or urban guerrillas; no further details of the killings were available.

Reports of co-operation between Khalqis, who oppose Karmal on several issues, including the continuing presence of 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and insurgents engaged in a two-year-old anti-Soviet guerrilla war have increased, diplomats said.

Unidentified terrorists also burned down Wazir Akbar Khan High school in Karta Parwan about three weeks ago, Afghan sources who travelled recently from Kabul said.

Guerrillas also set fire to the 20,000 square-foot Kabul Custom's House in the North-eastern industrial area of the capital last week, they reported. Officials rushed fire fighting equipment to the government building, the extent of damage was, however, not known.

Rebels are also reported to have shot down an official of Kabul province identified as Mohammed Hussen and burned his jeep in Qalai Murad Bag, about 25 miles from the capital this week.

Earlier in the week, diplomats reported two incidents of attacks

by Soviet soldiers on private houses in Kabul.

In a nearby suburb Soviet soldiers also broke into a house and attempted to kidnap the daughters of the owner. A gunfight broke out, leaving five Afghans and two Russian military men dead, they said.

The diplomats were unable to confirm the Afghan reports but they said violence in Kabul continued 'at least on a sustained level'.

REGIMENT DESTROYED: According to a report from Herat province Mujahideen of the Islamic Alliance destroyed completely a regiment of Afghan troops in Badkhis province in mid October. Regiment 70 came under heavy attack by Mujahideen in Kotai area among the Pistachio forests of Badkhis.

In this attack Mujahideen, under the command of Karam Khan and Malik Mohammad, led these troops under siege for three days continuously.

In the fighting Mujahideen killed four Russian advisors 15 soldiers. 120 soldiers, however, joined Mujahideen.

In the fighting 5 Mujahideen were martyred and seven wounded.

According to a report for Kandahar, Arghandab came under heavy Russian bombardment recently which killed many concerned innocent villagers.

300 soldiers joined Mujahideen after they came under attack in Shawaki.

APPROVED: The Presidium of

the Ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan today approved a report by Afghan President Babrak Karmal on his "historic" 21-day visit to the Soviet Union, Kabul Radio reported.

The report was endorsed "wholeheartedly", and was called a "historic step" which would have "international and internal repercussions beneficial to the Afghan people", the state-owned radio said in its Pushto-language news bulletin monitored in New Delhi.

The seven-member presidium also approved a speech delivered by Mr. Karmal at the party meeting after his return from the Soviet Union on Nov. 5, the radio said. -UP/PP/AF/

SOVIETS LOSE CONTROL OF SOUTHERN AFGHAN BORDER

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 19 Nov 80 p 5

[Text]

LONDON:

Soviet hopes of stabilising the Government of Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan have suffered severe setbacks, with Soviet and Afghan forces unable to control movements of refugees across the long border with Pakistan.

The Russians have tried bribery to split opposing tribes, but this strategy misfired disastrously in September with the killing of the Afghan Frontier Affairs Minister while engaged on a peace mission.

Loss of Soviet control of the Southern borders has resulted from the deployment of all available troops in Afghan cities, where they face increasing difficulties in holding down a hostile population. Reports from the border areas tell of bold attacks by Mujahidin bands, daylight raids, and kidnappings of officials in Jalalabad and even in the heavily guarded heart of Kabul.

Afghan guerrillas are aiming to disrupt all commercial traffic to the Pakistan frontier—fresh fruit exports are one of the few remaining sources of revenue left to the Kabul Government. Some 40 trucks laden with fruit for export were burned on the Kabul-Jalalabad highway in 10 days at the end of September, resulting in serious losses to the Afghan and Pakistani truck-owners and a likely ending to trade.

The southern borders are now more open than before and many thousands of Afghans are taking advantage of this to flee into Pakistan before the winter snows set in.

Many of the refugees are young high school and college students, teenagers fleeing from forced conscription into the Afghan army. But there are also men and women with professional skills—doctors, engineers and others—of the type the Karmal Government is attempting to keep inside the country by promises of better conditions and a refusal of passports on any pretext. Some of the refugees do not reach exile in safety, though, as booby-trap devices and mines have been laid along the trails and mountain passes to deter movements of all kinds across the border.

The bitter feelings aroused in this civil war are highlighted by the story of the death of Faiz Mohammad, the Frontier Affairs Minister, who made contact with the influential Zadran tribe of Waziristan, close to the border-land where he himself was born. The move was intended as part of a wider peace initiative.

The Minister swept into Pakhtia by helicopter with four other civil and military officers after careful negotiations and assurances of safe conduct. Inside the helicopters were a large sum of money and a ceremonial gift of three fat sheep—the traditional tribal accompaniment to peace-making.

An eye-witness account says that at first everything went well and according to custom, with the shooting of rifles into the air to mark the arrival of distinguished guests, the slaughter of the sheep, and preparations for the feast. Only after the meal was finished were the five men killed—as tools of the hated Russians.

After the murder, tribal leaders burned the bundles of banknotes—to the value of \$20,000 to \$60,000 by varying accounts—in front of the assembly, a move interpreted as a demonstration by the Zadran tribe that the killing took place not from greed but from patriotism.—P.T. Observer Service.

PRESIDENT KARMAL'S ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 21 Nov 80 pp 1, 7

[Text] NEW DELHI, Nov. 20: Kabul Radio said yesterday Afghan President Babrak Karmal had visited the Wakhan district of Afghanistan's north-eastern Province of Badakhshan which borders the Soviet Union.

There have been Press reports that the Soviet Union is in the process of annexing the largely-uninhabited 300 square KM (115 sq. mile) Wakhan corridor, which points towards China in the East between Pakistan and the Soviet Union.

It did not give a date for the visit by the Afghan leader who returned to Kabul on November 9 after a 21-day visit to the Soviet Union.

AFP adds: Mr Babrak Karmal has said his country wants to open political dialogue with Iran and Pakistan to resolve differences with them. Radio Kabul reported on Tuesday.

In an interview with French Radio and the Czechoslovak news agency Ceteka, the Afghan President reiterated his offer of Nov. 5 for seeking ways to finding a peaceful solution in the region, the Radio said.

The Afghan ruler, who on return from his 21-day tour of the Soviet Union criticised Pakistan in a tough-worded statement on alleged interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, now offered Kabul's friendship and co-operation to Islamabad.

Afghanistan, wanted friendly relations with all, particularly its neighbours and 'with Iran and Pakistan it wants to have the closest relations', the Radio quoted Mr. Karmal as saying.

Reuters adds: Babrak Karmal has issued a strong warning to dissidents within Afghanistan's Ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) and threatened them with expulsion from the party, diplomatic sources said here yesterday.

In a speech to party activists in Kabul after he returned from his first official visit to the Soviet Union, the Afghan leader said those not working for the good of the party would be expelled "even if they had been heroes in the past."

The sources said observers in Kabul saw this as a possible forerunner to the expulsion of past and present military commanders belonging to the party's Khalq (masses) faction hostile to President Karmal and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan — the Afghan leader heads the rival Parcham (flag) faction.

In his November 13 speech, which was later broadcast by Kabul Radio, President Karmal called for party discipline and 'unity in thought, conscience, honour, words and deeds.'

The sources said Interior Minister Mohammad Gulabzoi, a leader of the Khalq faction, was regarded as the main target of the attack against party dissidents.

According to earlier diplo-

matic reports, members of the Khalq faction were said in Kabul to have obtained arms from the Interior Minister and police stores and set up underground units.

In the broadcast monitored here this week, President Karmal spoke of 'eternal friendship and solidarity' with the Soviet Communist Party.

He said some party officials were abusing their position and warned dissidents that factionalism would never be tolerated.

"Compromise with this kind of situation is impossible," he said.

On the military front, the sources said air activity over Kabul was high in the past week and military convoys continued to rumble through the streets at night.

They said a convoy was seen returning from the Ghazni area south of Kabul last week with damaged tanks on 15 transporters. The sources said five Afghans and two Russians were killed on the night of November 14-15 when Soviet soldiers forcibly entered a house in the Kharte Parwan district of Kabul. Some reports said the soldiers were looking for girls but other reports said they only tried to take away valuable objects.

Police instructed Afghan witnesses to say that anti-Government rebels were responsible, according to the sources.—Reuters/AFP.

WRAPUP ON MUJAHIDEEN ACTIVITIES

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 18 Nov 80 pp 1, 5

[Text] NEW DELHI, Nov. 17 Afghan freedom fighters raided a women's prison north of Kabul last week, released all 58 inmates and killed several guards accused of supplying the convicts to entertain Soviet troops, a report from Afghanistan said yesterday.

Other guards helped in the release of the women last Monday from the prison at Charikar, the capital of Parwan province, 60 kilometres north of the capital, said a source in Kabul who in the past has been accurate.

A protest strike against the staying of five bus drivers by Russian soldiers has halted all bus service on the main north-south highway from Kabul through the Salang Pass tunnel to the Soviet border, the report from Afghanistan continued.

It said the drivers were killed last Nov. 8 in a dispute over Russian demands to supply them hashish at a bus stop at Kenian, 150 kilometres north of Kabul near the north portal of the tunnel.

Mujahideen in Paktia province continued to block a long caravan of trucks loaded with firewood for Kabul, now feeling the first blasts of winter, the report said. Not a single firewood truck has moved to the capital from Paktia since Nov. 8 despite efforts by Afghan and Soviet troops to clear the road. It added.

The latest Kabul report said firewood was selling there for as much as 150 Afghanis (\$3.75) for seven kilograms (\$15.4) nearly 10 times normal price.

Peshawar report adds: Hizb-i-Islami, Afghanistan reports from Kandooz province that Mujahideen attacked the water supply project in Khanabad district of Kandooz province. As a result, two Parchamite watchmen of the project were killed. One tank installed in front of the project was also destroyed.

A Press release of the Hizb-i-Islami said one tank was destroyed by a rocket launcher while it was standing in front of the oil station of Kandooz province. The same day, one high official of the Karmal regime was captured alive. He was executed by the Mujahideen summary Islamic Court.

Reports from Logar province say the Mujahideen executed 15 spies and pro-Russian elements captured in Logar province.

The report adds these persons have been involved in the murder and torture of innocent people and sending reports to the Government about the Mujahideen activities. The report also adds that Mujahideen in Logar province attacked a Russian convoy in Tangi area.

A tank and an armoured car and a carrier of food supplies were destroyed. No casualties were reported on the Mujahideen side.—AP/PTI

AIR ACTIVITY AROUND KABUL STEPPED UP

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 21 Nov 80 pp 1, 7

[Text] New Delhi, Nov. 20: Soviet helicopter activity has been stepped up around Kabul in what could amount to a new offensive against the guerillas in Afghanistan, western diplomatic sources said here today.

On November 15 the Afghan Defence Ministry announced joint ground and air manoeuvres in Kabul, Parwan, Ghazni and Nangarhar Provinces.

Dozens of Soviet helicopter gunships took to the air from Kabul and the activity was still continuing yesterday alongwith high-flying Soviet jet fighters and bombers, the sources said.

Joint Soviet-Afghan military contingents were reported conducting searches of villages for guerillas, and in Wardak province, west of Kabul, Soviet forces shelled a suspected guerilla encampment, the sources said.

Soviet forces had also tried for the fourth time to invade the Panshjir valley north-east of Kabul and were met with the usual stiff resistance by guerillas in four days of fighting, the sources said.

Villages near Kandhar in southern Afghanistan were reported to have been bombed by Soviet helicopters and jets, they said.

Kabul residents were woken during the night of November 10-11 by loud explosions from a battle that lasted seven hours in Hudkhel village on the outskirts of the capital.

Office workers travelling into Kabul the next day said they saw about a dozen bodies lying near a wall in the village which was surrounded by troops, the sources said.

The guerillas were reported to have attacked a police station at Kart-Nau near the village the same night and to have lost five men in the encounter though claiming the same number of dead among Afghan soldiers who fought them.

Another group of guerillas tried to blow up a nearby thermal power station but were discovered and chased away, the sources said.

The sources confirmed earlier diplomatic reports that a family of Afghans and two Soviet soldiers were killed last week when Russian troops forcibly entered a house in Kabul.

They said the home was that of a judicial official of the Afghan Government Interior Ministry who had just returned from leading a group of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.

A group of Soviet soldiers entered the house and killed the official, his wife, mother and three daughters. The official's son was reported to have evaded the soldiers by hiding under a quilt in the bathroom, the sources said.

Some reports said the Russians were looking for girls, but other reports said they tried to take away valuable objects.

The sources said Soviet officers, who were called to the scene by a police patrol, shot and killed two of the marauding Soviet soldiers on the spot.

Police had been told by the authorities to blame the incident on the guerillas, the sources said.

Kabul bus drivers refused to drive to the north on November 13 until guaranteed safe passage after a Soviet patrol was reported to have killed a bus driver and three passengers, the sources said.

At Jubal Serak on the same highway on November 14, a traveller reported seeing a burnt-out truck and the bodies of more than a dozen Afghan youths wearing the scarf of the Afghan Young Pioneers, a youth wing of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

The sources quoted the traveller as saying the youth had been attacked by guerillas who escaped with a number of sub-machineguns.

Meanwhile, Hezbe Islami, Afghanistan, reports from Laghman province that the Mujahideen attacked heavily the military base of Russians in Surkh-Kanoo area and destroyed a great number of tanks.

All those Russians who were in four-tracks were killed. The same day a convoy of Russians on its way from Jalalabad to Kabul was attacked by the Mujahideen and as a result 450 Russians were reported to have been killed.

According to another report received recently, Mujahideen attacked the houses of Russians in Samar-Khil area and killed seven Russians.

The representative of Hezbe-Islami, Afghanistan, reports from Salungar district that heavy conflicts happened between Mujahideen and the Russian troops.

During the conflicts which lasted for six hours 20 Russians were killed, a tank was destroyed and one rocket-launcher captured as booty from Russian troops.--
Reuter/PPI.

CSO: 4920

KASHENDI FALLS TO MUJAHIDEEN

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 22 Nov 80 pp 1, 5

(Text) PESHAWAR, Nov 21: According to a report from Balikh Province Mujahideen of Sarab under the command of Haji Abdul Mohammad brought Kashendi country of Sholgara Sub Province under their control in the fighting in the area.

Mujahideen destroyed two tanks and killed 21 agent troops, says a Press release of Islamic

Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan.

A report from Kunar Province said that Mujahideen launched a guerrilla attack on Sarkani Sub Province and burned down one jeep, and also killed the commander and two of his associates.

They also burned down one house belonging to a Parchami.

According to another report from Kunar Province Mujahideen of Daywagal under the command of Said Khan made an attack on a military convoy on the way between Norgai and Patan. In the fighting Russian troops suffered heavy casualties and one armoured car was destroyed.

According to a report from Badakhshan, Russian troops launched a savage attack on Shahr-i Bozurg, but the Mujahideen repulsed the attack.

The fighting lasted for four days and hundreds of Russians (including several officers) were killed.

Mujahideen and villagers casualties were 38 dead and 90 wounded.

Shakhsikhun Baguvan, Angarian, Malwan, Koral, Gardani

Rayg, Barias and Safaid Shar Villages were heavily damaged and many schools, mosques and houses completely destroyed.

According to a Karachi report:

Armed clashes have taken place between Government forces and the Afghan freedom fighters in Parwan and Badakhshan provinces of Afghanistan. Radio Pakistan quoting Kabul Radio reported today.

Radio Pakistan quoted Voice of Germany as saying that Afghan freedom fighters are putting up fierce fighting against Government forces in Panjsher Valley about 150 kilometers north of Kabul.

A fourth attempt is now being made to dislodge the freedom fighters from this strategic valley and gain control over the area.

Another report said the Soviet troops have received a set back in the Panjsher Valley.—PPI.

BRIEFS

SOVIET, AFGHAN OFFICIALS KILLED—New Delhi, Nov. 22: Islamic freedom fighters and opponents of the Moscow-installed Afghan regime have murdered several Soviet and Afghan officials in Kabul in recent weeks, Afghan and diplomatic sources said today. Unknown assailants killed the principal of a Junior High School, and assassinated an Afghan official outside the Ministry of Education this week, diplomats said. Officials in Kabul did not know whether the assassins of the two men, both members of President Babrak Karmal's Parcham or Flag faction of the ruling Marxist People's Party, were members of the opposing Khalq, or People's, faction or urban guerillas. There were no further details of the killings. Reports of co-operation between Khalqis, who oppose Karmal on several issues, including the continuing presence of 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and insurgents engaged in a two-year-old anti-Soviet guerilla war have increased, diplomats said. Earlier in the week, diplomats reported incidents of attacks by Soviet soldiers on private houses in Kabul. Russian soldiers killed an Interior Ministry official, his wife, mother and three daughters before being gunned down by Soviet Military Police on the night of November 14, the diplomats said. More kidnap cases have been reported by Soviet soldiers.—APP. [Text] [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 23 Nov 80 pp 1, 5]

SOVIET FORCES FIGHTING MUJAHIDS—New Delhi, Nov 21: Major Soviet forces are in action against Afghan freedom fighters in four provinces around Kabul, diplomatic sources in New Delhi said today. They said Soviet helicopter gunship activity over Kabul had been heavy for many days and large military convoys continued to pass through the city daily. But the sources said there was not enough information to say whether a large-scale planned offensive was being waged against the nationalists before winter sets in or a series of sweeps were being carried out against various pockets of resistance. Soviet ground and air forces were in action against the freedom fighters in Wardak, Logar, Nagahar and Parwan provinces, the sources said. More killings occurred in Kabul, including two this week when a school principal was shot and another man was gunned down outside the Ministry of Education, the sources said. The sources said both these victims were believed to be members of President Babrak Karmal's Parcham (flag) faction of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Vehicle searches for arms were frequent and thorough in Kabul and on all approach roads. Motorists are stopped several times on every road going out of Kabul, the sources said.—Reuter. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 22 Nov 80 p 6]

BIG SOVIET OFFENSIVE—London, Nov. 23: Soviet troops in Afghanistan have launched a major offensive against resistance fighters in Logar province, south of Kabul, BBC reported today. In a report from New Delhi the BBC said the move was the Soviets' most determined effort yet to smash the resistance in Logar province. The BBC spoke of a "large-scale invasion" of the province. Soviet warplanes had "brutally" bombed villages. Heavy losses were reported. Afghan troops were not involved in the fighting, apparently because too many of them had deserted, the radio said.—DPA [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 24 Nov 80 p 1]

ALGERIA

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED

Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 26 Oct 80 pp 1, 5

[Article by Jamal Salihi: "National People's Assembly: Discussion of Long-Term Economic Development Directions"]

[Text] The National People's Assembly works yesterday were distinguished by the convocation of a special morning session under the chairmanship of brother Rabi' Bitat, Political Bureau member and the National People's Assembly speaker, to receive Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom.

The morning session, which conducted its works in the presence of brother 'Abd al-Hamid Brahimi, Central Committee member and the minister of planning and of national development, was devoted to hearing a part of the Planning and Finance Committee report on the long-term economic and social development directions within the framework of the [assembly's] discussions on the bill concerning the Five-Year Plan.

This part of the report was discussed by the deputies. The minister of planning provided explanations on their observations and queries.

The Planning and Finance Committee report, read by brother 'Abd al-Aziz Belkhadem, the committee rapporteur, dealt with the economic, social and cultural development strategy followed in the preceding 10-year plan which required in particular realizing the goals embodied in:

Eliminating the causes of unemployment.

Providing education to all children.

Building an apparatus capable of guaranteeing our growth and of bolstering our independence.

Eliminating the factional [al jihaw] differences, in addition to recovering [sic] the national resources and dealing with the changes that have taken place at the industrial, agricultural, social and political levels.

The report noted that as it has produced significant results in all spheres, this strategy has also created flaws producing negative aspects that have intensified as a result of the profound changes that have occurred in our economy.

Thus, 55 percent of the investments have gone for industry, 9.2 percent for agriculture, irrigation and fishing and more than 36 percent for the other sectors (construction, public works, the social sector, the infrastructures and so forth).

Considerable differences have also been recorded between the estimated and the realized gross national production. Whereas the estimates amounted to 9 percent for the first 4-year plan and 11.2 percent for the second 4-year plan, the actual accomplishments amounted to no more than 5.9 percent and 5.5 percent successively. As for the individual citizen, the gross national production has only realized a poor growth of 2-3 percent annually.

Generally, the production and productivity goals have not been realized insofar as the investment goals are concerned. Thus, the conditions of economic integration have not been realized and this has caused resorting to the outside world [to meet the demand].

The tendency toward importation has risen from 23 percent in 1967 to 48 percent in 1980 and this has damaged our balance of payments severely.

As for incomes, they have developed by a large degree as a result of the investments which rose at a rapid rate of 8 percent in the first 3-year plan, 11 percent in the first 4-year plan and 17 percent in the second 4-year plan.

Because the incomes have not developed by the same degree for the various social groups, the rise in prices has hurt the classes with limited or fixed incomes more strongly than others.

As for the social results, we must note the tangible development in the level of employment, considering that 1.1 million non-agricultural jobs have been created during the 10-year plan and that the democracy of education has been actually realized in view of the fact that 73 percent [of those eligible for schooling] were enrolled in schools in 1978. In the sphere of health, this period has been characterized by the realization of an extremely significant accomplishment, namely the establishment of free medical care. Insofar as housing is concerned, this period has shown that this sector has not been given priority despite the significant efforts exerted in the countryside.

The Planning and Finance Committee report then dealt with the broad lines of the coming 10-year plan which includes the 1980-84 plan.

If the goals drawn up for our 1980-90 10-year economic plan seek to meet the social needs primarily, then the broad lines of this 10-year plan should seek to:

Bolster and develop our energy potentials.

Mobilize the water resources to a maximum.

Focus on and expand agriculture.

Follow up development of the essential and basic traditional industries to cut off the ties of dependence on the outside world.

The dimensions of these tasks and awareness of the demographic growth and of its impact on work and production make it possible to measure the (resources harnessed) to accomplish the tasks. If the population reaches 27 million by 1990 and if we take into consideration complete elimination of the deficient use of manpower and the return of emigrants, then the total number of working people will amount to 6.3 million people in 1990 whereas it was 3.7 million people in 1979.

Creation of the manpower constitutes the main and permanent task of the economic policy of the long-term plans.

Quantitatively, the policy to create the manpower requires:

Improving the elementary and intermediate education.

Developing the formation of such manpower within the economic units in a concerned manner.

Exerting effective and wide-scale efforts to develop the components.

The incomes produced by the activity of the real funds and services during this period will grow by more than 150 percent over the preceding period. This total growth in the non-agricultural economy includes the growth in incomes resulting from a growth of 180 percent in wages and of nearly 70 percent in incomes from other than wages. The total consumption will rise by nearly 120 percent between 1979 and 1990.

As for social needs, employing the national language at all levels of education and using this language in all branches require all the sections of the educational, cultural and developmental apparatus to exert big efforts.

The number of students in elementary education in the year 1990 will exceed their number in 1979 by one million students. The number of students in intermediate education will amount to 1.7 millions, the number of high school students will rise by 400,000 and the number of students in higher education will reach 200,000.

In the sphere of housing, the matter concerns the construction of 1.2 million housing units. The committee has proposed that this figure be raised to 2 million units if we want to attain the housing conditions prevailing in 1966.

Meeting all these social and other needs requires an annual production growth rate of 8 percent.

The results expected in the various production sectors will be reflected in a gradual bolstering of our economic and financial independence. Revenues from monies and services should be reduced to the lowest level possible and should drop from 50 percent to 25 percent by 1990.

Generally, revenues from services and monies will increase at a lower rate than the increase rate in the national production (5 percent compared to 8 percent).

As for exports, the major part will continue to consist of fuels. Assuming that fuel prices will develop appropriately and considering the volume of investments in this 10-year plan--a volume amounting to 900 billion dinars--the balance of monies and services will be in equilibrium generally.

During the coming plan, it is necessary to secure nearly 50 billion dinars in new foreign loans to meet the deficit in foreign debt repayment and to guarantee equilibrium in the balance of payments.

After the 1984-90 period, the surplus produced by the exchange of monies and services should guarantee the full repayment of the inherited debt, including the currently planned debt. It should also guarantee completion of the 10-year plan without new financial obligations that are liable to affect the foreign balances in the long run.

After a review of the broad lines of the long-term economic and social development by the Planning and Finance Committee rapporteur, a number of deputies spoke to underline the human element as an essential and indispensable condition for the success of the development plan, in addition to the material and financial conditions. The deputies also inquired about the theoretical and methodological concepts on which the plan relies, especially since this is the first time that the national development plan is discussed at the various levels and since it is the first time that the National People's Assembly takes part in discussing it. Stress was also put on the need to devote more attention to the agricultural section and not to rely on the fuel section, considering that it is a depletable resource. Stress was also put on the importance of control in its various forms and on the sound management of the establishments by reorganizing them so as to ease the pressures and tensions and to eliminate the drawbacks.

In his reply, the minister of planning shared the view of the deputies who see the need for devoting greater attention to the human element. In this regard, the minister stressed that there must be a clear policy in the field of fuels so that we may not rely on them, considering that they are a depletable resource. The minister also stressed the need to rely on work as the only and permanent means of wealth. However, this goal requires time, as the minister has said.

In the sphere of agriculture for which the investments allocated are, in the view of a number of deputies, small, the minister noted that not all the investments allocated for this sector have been used and that the problem in agriculture is not so much a financial problem as it is a problem of work, organization and productivity.

Concerning the return of the emigrants, the minister stressed that measures can be taken for the return of a larger number than agreed upon with the French authorities, should the occasion arise, without the need to reconsider the plan.

8494

CSO: 4402

AUTHORITIES ALLOW EXEMPT COMPANY TO PROCEED WITH SHARE ISSUE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 pp 14-15

[Text]

Bahrain's Ministry of Commerce has allowed an Exempt Company to proceed with a share issue which was originally cancelled when it became apparent that it had been oversubscribed about 680 times.

The Arab International Insurance Company EC (AIIC) was among the first Exempt Company to make a share issue after the lifting of a ban on the registration of such companies. The ban, lifted two months ago, was imposed after an issue by the Gulf Investment Co was oversubscribed more than 1,000 times last October; at the same time, Gulf Medical Projects Co, a joint venture involving the government of Sharjah, set something of a record by attracting \$8 billion worth of bids for a share issue with a face value of only \$4 million (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, October 1, 1979).

Exempt Companies – so-called because they are not required to have any local participation, let alone a controlling Bahraini interest – enjoy the same tax advantage as other companies. They are not, however, permitted to compete on the local market and Bahraini citizens and companies may not apply for shares on public offer, although they may participate as founders.

The AIIC offered 2.5 million shares at their face value of \$1 million for public subscription out of an issued capital of \$6 million; the company's authorised capital is \$10 million. It has been decided to allot shares on the basis of 1.47 for every 1,000 applied for, which indicates that the issue was over-subscribed 680

times; this would put the total application at about \$1.7 billion.

The Commerce Ministry at first refused to accept the result, suspecting that there must have been some duplication during the two-week subscription period; however, reports from Bahrain said last week, they rescinded their decision after consultations with AIIC's founders, who are principally from Kuwait.

Under Bahraini law, an applicant for a share issue on public offer may submit an offer for a maximum of 10,000 shares; however, reports from Bahrain said, it used to be a well-known practice for copies of nationality certificates to be bought and sold to enable potential subscribers to submit more than one bid under different names.

The reports quoted the Director of Commercial and Company Affairs at the Commerce Ministry, Ahmed Hubail, as saying that AIIC applied for offshore public company status before the laws were tightened up, and therefore copies of nationality certificates were accepted under the old regulations.

Mr Hubail said that in September, when an issue by the Arab Iron and Steel Company was oversubscribed 42 times, applicants were required to register in advance and to produce original identification documents in support of their application. This procedure would be adopted in all future offshore public company share issues, he said.

BRIEFS

STOCKPILING HITS SHIPYARD BOOKINGS--Bookings at ASRY are 20 to 30 per cent below capability but industry sources blame the oil supply situation rather than high insurance rates resulting from hostilities in the Gulf. Western Oil stocks are at record levels, and many crude carriers are in use as floating storage tanks. A spokesman for the Bahrain-based shipyard, which is owned by member states of Oapec, said the dry dock utilisation rate for October was 75%. Bookings for November are down 70% of capacity, with a slight improvement towards the end of the year. Last year vessels were so tightly scheduled for entering the dry-dock that the occupancy rate rose to more than 94 per cent but in March there was a temporary setback in response to increased war risk premiums with a 15 per cent fall in booking. April and May were fully booked but there was the usual quiet period during the summer and demand has not yet picked up. Industry sources believe that as much depends on the level of oil consumption in the West--which to some extent could be boosted by a severe winter--as on future development at the head of the Gulf. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 8 Nov 80 p 12]

WAR HOLDS UP SHIPMENTS--Midal Cables of Bahrain is holding \$500,000 worth of aluminum conductor for Iran and is delaying manufacture of another \$1.5 million worth of orders. General Manager Straut Mansfield told the GULF MIRROR last week: "We were loading up trucks to take the cables to the port the day war broke out." The order cannot be shipped at present but I am reasonably confident of arranging shipping in the not too distant future." The Iranian Port of Bandar Abbas is open, Mr Mansfield said but Midal will have to bear higher freight and insurance costs to get its goods through since this was a package deal including carriage insurance and forwarding. The major customer in Iran is the state electricity undertaking and Mr Mansfield expects further big orders once hostilities cease. "Commercial contact with Tehran is still good," he added. Another aluminum exporter hit by the war is Balco, the marketing organisation which handles the Bahrain and Saudi government offtakes from ALBA. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 8 Nov 80 p 12]

IRON PELLET PLANT--The Arab Iron and Steel Company of Bahrain expects to begin producing iron pellets by the spring of 1983, the company's General Manager Omar Grine announced recently. The company, Mr Grine said, plans to build a plant with an annual capacity of 4 million tonnes at a cost of \$300 million, with output going mainly to the Gulf market. When the pellet plant is operational, the company plans to move towards producing steel, Mr Grine said. The Arab Iron and Steel

Company was formed recently and has an authorised capital of \$150 million; 110 million shares with a par value of \$1, of which 50 per cent has been paid up. The company's founders hold 62 million shares and they include investors from Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Jordan and Iraq. The public was invited to subscribe for the remaining 48 million shares and the issue was oversubscribed by 42 times. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 p 16]

CSO: 4820

MILITARY TOWNS BUILT TO HOUSE ARMY PERSONNEL

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 1 Aug 80 p 4

[Article by Faruq al-Shadhili: "Inauguration of First Military Town Near Nasr City; 341 Apartments Delivered to Members of Armed Forces; Three Towns in Dahshur, Suez and Isma'ilia"]

[Text] Lt Gen Ahmad Badawi, the minister of defense and of war production, has opened the first military town for housing officers of the armed forces.

The land was prepared, the housing built and the utilities supplied in 18 months. A total of 341 personnel housing units were turned over yesterday and 500 more units will be delivered by the end of this year. The town has been named al-Tawfiq town and it is one of four towns being built by the armed forces in Dahshur, Inshas and on the Cairo-Isma'ilia highway and Cairo-Suez highway. Al-Tawfiq town is located near Nasr City. Lieutenant General Badawi has laid down the cornerstone in al-Tawfiq town for the construction of 2,400 more units. Lt Gen Ahmad Badawi declared at the inauguration of the town: "It has become familiar to us to see new projects in which the armed forces have undertaken the full responsibility of implementation." Badawi also said that the inauguration of the first phase of the personnel housing units in al-Tawfiq town confirms this fact and that this project deserves to be given attention and to be studied so that we may proceed toward similar projects which will ultimately realize self-sufficiency for our armed forces in the sphere of personnel housing in the military towns that are scheduled to be built.

Badawi added: These projects represent an effective contribution on the part of the armed forces in solving the housing crisis. At the same time, the projects realize psychological and moral stability for the members of our armed forces. This is something in which we eagerly participate because of its positive impact on the performance of the armed forces.

Maj Gen Engineer Husayn Anwar, the head of the Armed Forces Major Projects Agency, declared that 341 personnel housing units have been distributed in the first phase of the town, that 500 more units will be delivered by the end of this month [sic] and that construction works will continue until the number of units in the town amounts to 1,840 units by the beginning of 1982.

Anwar added that some improvements and changes will be made in the coming phase, that the parts for these buildings have been manufactured at the prefabricated building plants of the armed forces, that they have been constructed by the troops and the officers themselves and that modern materials have been used in the finishing works for the buildings.

EGYPT

DEVELOPMENT WITHIN ARMED FORCES SIGNAL CORPS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 22 Aug 80 pp 18-19

[Article by Hamdi Lutfi: "Hot Line Incorporated Into Our Armed Forces; How Did Signal Corps Fight Among Vanguard Formations; What Has President al-Sadat Secretly Given the Egyptian Army Corps in Which He Served as Officer"]

[Text] The signal corps of our armed forces are undergoing a new scientific and technological revolution. They have recently used the "hot line."

This line and its wide-range electronic network represent the highest advanced level of combining wire and radio service.

It is the open path for applying command and control over the forces in their military fronts without the use of the human factor!

Come let us cast a look on this new area of the scientific revolution among the formation of our armed forces.

The signal corps of our armed forces is eager to carry out its annual plans in a manner that makes it possible for it to keep up pace with the international developments in the major armies--the signals developments that have practically created a technological revolution in radio and electronic communications for military purposes--and to realize the highest standards of military command and control over the field armies and the combat formations spread throughout the frontlines and the deep theaters of military operations.

The Egyptian Signal Corps has made positive strides in developing signals communication through their brilliant action in the glorious October war.

Throughout recent years, the signals corps has urged the latest "western-made" communications equipment, has applied the most advanced accomplishments realized by technology and has recorded successive accomplishments, of which the latest is that "hot line" which the corps has added to our armed forces--a line which reflects a very advanced level of combined wire and radio service. The corps has actually put into operation this line or this electronic network of centrals [telephone exchanges] which has a range of more than 7,000 kilometers.

Maj Gen Ahmad Pu'ad, signal corps commander and one of the heroes of the glorious October, has told me that "the system of automatic electronic centrals represents a modern method in bolstering military signals communications and in enhancing the standard of their performance to help realize automatic command and control at the most advanced command levels adopted by the major armies in the 1980's."

The "hot line" of our armed forces is characterized by increasing the number of linkage channels without using the human factor, and by the automatic manipulation of the free channels to raise the capacity for rapid communication among the network of automatic military centrals that are connected to the transit [sic] centrals.

What are the transit centrals?

The centrals of the automatic telephone network in the military commands, formations and cantonments operates through dividing the command centers into sectors whereby every sector has a portable (intiqali) transit central and each unit and formation has a subsidiary central linked to the transit centrals. Each transit central in every military sector operates on a special code number and is used to establish automatic communications among the various sectors. This constitutes an advanced level of signals service.

The hot line guarantees confidentiality, security and speed through automatic linkage.

This system includes a number of modern electronic centrals produced by the French (Thomson) Company. This company had earlier received a group of Egyptian signals officers who underwent a 4 month training course and acquired practical and scientific experience in operating the electronic centrals that function on computerized programs, using electronic components and circuits. The officers then returned home and took part in the measurement and installation works that are of a technical level as high as that of the European microwave system, the (triospheric) system, pivotal communications system, the cipher system and the telex system.

These expert Egyptian signal corps officers and the groups they trained after their return to the homeland used their scientific and field experience in planning and constructing the new telephone networks, and the pivotal cable projects for the Telecommunications Authority when the signals corps was entrusted with an important role in solving the telephone problems facing the Egyptian masses. This was done as part of the armed forces' participation in building various projects within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport, Communication and Maritime Transport.

The Egyptian signal corps has always been in the vanguard, and the bravest signal corps men sacrificed their lives while marching forth to liberate the Sinai in the October 1973 war. This is a story that has not yet been accorded sufficient recognition—the story of the heroic glory of the signal corps. From the time of the preparations for the glorious war, during the war itself and then in the stage of deployment and control over liberated Sinai, not a single military position was cut off from the signal corps. This in itself represents a superior field performance. Signals are the nerves, ears and eyes of the commander, the aorta and artery of the heart and the brain in the head. Victory and supremacy by the armed forces on land, at sea and in the air depend on the efficiency of this corps, its scientific standard, and the training and steadfastness of its men.

I will cite here some details of the concerted efforts made by the signal corps men when I accompanied them on the western bank of the canal and then in the Sinai when we crossed to it on that glorious day in history.

One of the major problems that our forces had to overcome in order to begin crossing the canal was the communications problem and the need to secure signals at high efficiency so that all the armed forces command and elements could be linked with each other as of the first minutes of the movement [crossing], rather a long time before the movement—which is no longer a secret now—in order to make it possible to have command control over the vast numbers of our fighters. We also had to transport voluminous equipment and minute equipment to the eastern bank. We performed our tasks with magnificent success, thanks to the comprehensive training that had taken place during the years of patience and silence.

In simulating the canal, our training was not far from the canal itself. In fact, the training took place in the canal itself, across al-Ballah Island. During the operations, nobody in Sinai west of the canal, even during the so-called loss of contact with the heroic Third Army, felt that he was cut off in terms of communication from the rest of the forces.

Before the war, we took into consideration the fact that the Israeli enemy would utilize radio jamming of our communications. This is a lesson that we had learned from the 1967 war. The enemy actually did exploit all scientific resources to jam our communications but we countered all attempts with 100 percent success. After a while, the enemy completely abandoned these endeavors, having realized that they had been a failure.

The signal corps now includes all kinds of electronic equipment. In the major powers, they do not call this corps the signals corps but the electronic equipment [sic] corps because this branch includes signals communication, electronic war equipment, the means of remote control over intercontinental missiles and anti-ballistic missiles. Thus, the Egyptian signal corps was able to excel over the enemy with the mettle, training and education of the Egyptian fighter, and with its own electronic capabilities.

This is why a number of foreign journalists said that the Egyptian signal corps surpassed Israel's by several years.

During the war of attrition, the troops who crossed over to the eastern bank to fight the enemy there used to set up radio communication between the eastern and western banks and communicated with some cities in the republic.

I remember a soldier from Aswan who crossed over to the eastern bank, fought and destroyed one of the strong positions on the Bar-lev line during the 1970 operations and who asked a colleague in the signal corps to help him contact his father at the High Dam. In minutes, this soldier was talking to his father and the father could not believe his son when the latter told him: I am talking to you from the Sinai.

Many of our soldiers kept on writing letters to their families in 1969-70 while fighting their battles in the Sinai and before returning to their bases on the west bank. The signal corps was always careful to convey the letters to the people concerned. During the combat, storming and development of the offensive in the immortal October war, the signal corps continued to be careful to give military mail from the frontlines and from deep inside theaters of operation top-level service.

There were mobile post offices which crossed the canal with the first waves. This was done on the instructions of President al-Sadat--instructions which we carried out. Those post offices had special sections for money orders. After combat, some of our troops remembered to send their wages to their families through the military post offices which moved to the liberated territories even before they were liberated.

When history records that the fate of the 10th of Ramadan operations was determined in the first hours of the successful crossing operations and of storming Israel's defenses tactically. When we learn that the main means of communication in this phase was the means of radio communication and that in some special operations this means was actually the only means, then we can determine fully the role played by radio communications, especially at the lower tactical levels, at the level of combat units and even the level of brigades and divisions when a part of those forces was on the eastern bank while the other part was still on the western bank.

The use of sophisticated radio equipment by some of the forces which carried out special-type operations, such as the forces opening gaps in the earth barrier and the shock troops behind the enemy lines, had a great impact on keeping the initiative and control in the hands of these forces throughout the operations. This is in addition to the operations of the air and naval forces which maintained constant and unflawed radio communication among their units through various means and not just one means, by way of the links in control of the formations [units].

Before, during and after the war, the members of the radio communication stations continued to operate as a single team, in the sense that each member knew the others in every sense of the word. Every group knew the members of the group of the station on the other side and were aware of their method of work and their characteristics. Each member reached the point where he could tell that a colleague was absent from the other station by discerning an unusual change in the station's operational characteristics. There is no doubt that this standard of training facilitated uninterrupted communication and even protected our communications from the jamming and deception elements to which the enemy had previously resorted but which he could not use against us in the 1973 war.

A signal corps commander has told me:

We had been ready before President al-Sadat celebrated the signal corps day with us before the end of 1972. We had been ready half a year earlier. We continued specialized training and careful and timed coordination compatible with the various forms of the enemy defenses and compatible primarily with the unconventional offensives that had to be carried out by our armed forces, requiring special arrangements on the part of the signal corps.

For example, the signal communication cables across the canal were built in the first minutes, and not hours, of our forces' crossing of the Suez Canal. The main units, the subsidiary units and the minor units continued to be in complete contact while the operations were being carried out. We achieved speed records in establishing communication with the command center and, consequently, with the signals centers at the tactical and mobilizational combat levels. We also used multi-channel radio communication equipment for tactical, mobilizational and strategic purposes, all of which strengthened our forces' signals communications.

Multi-channel radio communication combines the characteristics of single-channel communication through stationary positions with the system of communication with various corps. This helped to convey command orders to the combatants easily and to receive communiques and information with the same ease and speed.

The signal units working in the frontline field installations were able in the few years preceding the war to construct thousands of kilometers of heavy cable lines--a signals system that is most strongly exposed to being severed or destroyed by artillery shelling or air force bombing or by the movement of our tank and armored forces. Thanks to the vigilance, energy, daring and training of our men, these lines continued to be intact and available to all the elements of our forces throughout the operations. The signal corps men sacrificed their lives to keep the communication between the commanders and the fighters at all combat levels open and safe.

The sacrifice with which the martyred heroes have decorated the signal corps, its long history of struggle and its constant strife since the 1930's to maintain the elements of superiority was thus crowned. Many are the Egyptian minds capable of innovating and of bringing about developments year after year. President al-Sadat was one of those youth when he tried to develop the signal systems in 1939 and clashed with the British commands that rejected all forms of improvement and development when they concerned the Egyptians. This constituted the start of his confrontation with the occupying British commands and his defiance of the colonialists. However, President al-Sadat has never forgotten the importance of the signal corps. The first of his successful practical steps in diversifying the sources of weaponry was that step which he made secretly and through which he acquired modern equipment for the signal corps in November 1971. This secret did not become known until the 6 October 1973 celebrations.

President al-Sadat visited the comrades-in-arms of the signal corps in 1972 and wrote these words in the visitors' book: "I want the signal corps to be in the vanguard when we fight our battle--a corps always capable with the brains and faith of its members before their equipment."

The battle did take place and the standing of the Egyptian signal men, the greatest and bravest of men, escalated.

8494
CSO: 4802

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AGENCY REORGANIZED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 4 Aug 80 p 1

[Article: "Five Offices Under Control of Socialist Prosecutor for Notifications, Investigation, Custodianship and Research"]

[Text] Counselor 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, has issued a decision to reorganize and redistribute the powers and the responsibilities in accordance with the new law for the protection of values from shame. The decision provides for the creation of five offices for notifications, litigation, investigation, prosecution, complaints, appeals, management of funds placed under custodianship, research and classification of sentences.

The decision provides for the notifications and litigation office to have the power to review all the notifications and cases presented to the agency and the cases received from the general prosecution for criminal prosecution, to examine the issues affecting a public interest concerning the citizens on the instructions of the president of the republic or of the People's Assembly or at the request of the prime minister, prepare the annual report and answer the People's Assembly's observations, propose amnesty or mitigation of penalties and propose and study requests for reconsideration.

The investigation and prosecution office will have the power to investigate and to prosecute before the Values Court the actions resulting in political liability in accordance with the law for the protection of values; the acts capable of harming the country's security or the socialist society's economic interests; the incidents of aggrandization in accordance with law No 34 of 1971 which regulates custodianship and safeguards the people's safety; investigate candidates for elections to whose nomination objections are raised in accordance with the laws to protect values and the law to protect the domestic front and social peace.

This office will also represent the agency when appeals against the objection decisions are made before the Values Court, will investigate issues touching on a public interest concerning the citizens, will supervise implementation of the sentences, instructions and decisions issued in the cases of political liability and will report on the appeals made against the sentences issued by the Values Court.

The complaints and appeals office: This office will receive, examine and act on the complaints submitted to the agency by the citizens (and will make the nominations for the higher positions).

Management of funds placed under custodianship: This office will implement the socialist prosecutor's decisions banning a person from disposing of his property and will manage such property, will initiate the lawsuits concerning such property, be they made by the agency or by others, and will follow up implementation of the sentences issued on such cases.

Office of research and classification of sentences: This office will be in charge of preparing legal studies, will propose the legislative amendments to deal with gaps developing from application of the law to protect values from shame and the others laws linked to it, will classify the sentences issued by both levels of the Values Court, will conclude the legal principles and will file the sentences issued by the Custodianship Court.

Counselor 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad has also issued a decision organizing the powers and responsibilities of the public prosecutor's assistants.

The decision provides for appointing Yusuf Darraz as head of the notifications and litigation office and 'Abd al-Hamid al-Buhayri and Ahmad Dahshan as members.

The decision also provides for appointing Lawyer Naji Ishaq as head of the investigation and prosecution office and Hanafi Rizq, 'Adil 'Abd al-Hamid, 'Izzat al-Sayyid, Muhammad 'Abd al-Hakim, Anwar Rashad al-'Asi, Najib Yunis, Mahrus 'Abd-al-Halim and Mahmud Zaki al-Sharbini as members.

The decision also appoints Lawyer Ahmad Jamal 'Abd al-Hakim as head of the complaints and appeals office and Nabil Muhammad 'Abd al-Nabi and Jamal Safwat as members. The decision also appoints Lawyer Hilmi Khalifah as head of the office of management of the properties placed under custodianship and 'Abd-al-Qahhar Zahaqi, Husayn Muhammad, Husni 'Abd al-Hamid and 'Abd al-Mun'im Ahmad as members.

Dr Sulayman 'Abd al-Majid will head the office of research and classification of sentences.

8494

CSO: 4802

COMMITTEE APPROVES JERUSALEM CONSTRUCTION PLAN

TA031648 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 3 Dec 80

[Excerpts] The Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem Affairs today endorsed a 5-year plan for the development of north Jerusalem, on the completion of which the number of Jewish residents in the area will rise to 100,000. This project is intended for the territory that was expropriated south of the Neve Ya'akov neighborhood some 1 year ago, in order to create a continuum among the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem.

A portion of the territory will be allocated for the construction of 5,000 housing units for Arab inhabitants. Our correspondent Moshe Hakohen reports:

[Begin recording] The area of 4,600 dunams that was last year expropriated south of the Neve Ya'akov neighborhood, will constitute the main reserve of land for construction until the mid 80's. This was reported by Minister of Housing and Construction David Levi today at the meeting of the Ministerial Committee that approved the 5-year plan for the development of the area. The minister reported that the potential of construction for public purposes in Jerusalem in the other new Jerusalem neighborhoods is only 2,000 housing units.

According to Minister Levi, since the unification of Jerusalem in June 1967 there has been an unprecedented housing upswing in Jerusalem. In this period of time 35,000 housing units were set up in just public construction.

According to the data reported by the minister of housing, the percentage of Jewish population in Jerusalem, in comparison to the Arab population, has declined 1.6 percent since 1967. In the wake of the construction momentum expected in Jerusalem on the approval of the 5-year plan, the proportions of Arab and Jewish population may be restored to that which previously existed.

In the framework of the 5-year plan, the committee has also approved the paving of a road that will connect Bayt Horon, via the Ramot neighborhood with Ma'ale Adummim.

The chairman of the Ministerial Committee, Minister Yosef Burg said after the meeting that intense negotiations are now being conducted over the transfer of the ministries of agriculture and construction to Jerusalem, and the transfer of the prime minister's office to east Jerusalem:

[Burg] The prime minister is not only a prime minister. He is also in charge of his own office. Some day he will make his decision.

[Hakchen] At the moment there is no decision, so I understand.

[Burg] The decision exists, as is well known. But I do not have the technical and chronological details. [End recording]

CSO: 4805

SHARON ON SETTLEMENT ISSUE, RIOTS, WEIZMAN

TA291325 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0605 GMT 29 Nov 80

[Interview with Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon by Shim'on Schiffer, date and place not given--recorded]

[Excerpt] [Schiffer] The disturbances by students in Judaea and Samaria over the last several weeks, the attack on the children of Qedumin settlers, the revived debate on the size of the defense budget and 'Ezer Weizman's expulsion from the Herut movement were some of the issues I asked the agriculture minister about. This is Shim'on Schiffer.

Ari'el Sharon does not shoot from the hip in his answers. He maneuvers very carefully between what he thinks and what he is willing to say in public. According to Sharon the quiet that prevailed until recently in the territories was the result of a tactical move and not a planned policy. Sharon does not wholeheartedly accept the methods now used in Judaea and Samaria in suppressing student riots.

[Sharon] I believe that we must deal with the situation with fairness and firmness. I do not think that the only answer to the problem is shooting. We faced a similar problem of student demonstrations in the Gaza Strip in the past and our answer to the problem then was different. This does not in any way mean that sometimes situations are not created in which there is no other alternative but to fire. If soldier's lives are endangered, there is no alternative but to shoot. However, there is a variety of other courses of action. In my opinion it is also desirable to refrain as much as possible from collective punishment. There is no simple answer to the problem. This issue must be tackled daily. The military authorities should have time to deal with this problem on a daily basis, and to daily look for solutions that would be suitable to any situation that may rise, not only for a situation that has already arisen.

[Schiffer] A dialogue with the inhabitants of the territories should be conducted on the autonomy plan. As a result of Sharon's initiative, the ministerial team for the autonomy talks has recently endorsed the proposal according to which the inhabitants of the territories would participate along with the Israeli settlers in the division of water and land resources. Of course, the land in question is public land that will be placed at the public disposal once the land required for security and settlement is allotted.

Ari'el Sharon firmly rejects the argument that it is the establishment of settlements in regions densely populated by Arabs that causes the situation in the territories to deteriorate.

[Sharon] We heard this perverse argument after the murder of the young people who returned from prayer in Hebron. I can only ask this question: Following the murder of the children and husband of Smadar Haran [in a terrorist attack that occurred some 2 years ago] should Jews not live in Nahariyya? Following the murder of the Ma'Alot children [a terrorist attack in which school children were killed and wounded] should we not live in Ma'Alot? After the atrocious murder on the coastal road, on the very outskirts of Tel Aviv, in which, among others, not a few children were murdered, should we conclude that we must not live in Tel Aviv?

[Schiffer] The agriculture minister also rejects the ideas raised by Alignment figures who said that they will work for the degeneration [nivun] of the settlements that were set up in areas that are not compatible with the Alignment's territorial compromise plan.

[Sharon] I hope that many of the excellent people in Israel who are Labor Party members--and there are many good people here who are aware of this problem and feel strongly about it--will be present in Judaea and Samaria at that time, [presumably when settlements are threatened by a future Alignment policy] in order to aid the settlements there to face the danger of those who want to ruin them.

[Schiffer] I will be there too, if things happen in that area, Sharon adds. His statements about the need to cut the defense budget in the past caused an uproar among the defense establishment leaders, but he had not retracted his demand to revise Israel's conception of defense and to cut the defense budget as a result. At the present moment too, not only is it possible to make cuts, but it is imperative, and over 20 billion Israeli pounds can be slashed from the defense budget. The security establishment exists, it is strong and firm notwithstanding the fact that almost 10 billion pounds have been slashed from it. Ari'el Sharon says that there is a limit to what the state of Israel can afford.

[Sharon] We will have to reduce the size of the army. I mean the standing army. We should return to the conceptions accepted in the past, namely of more reserve army and less of a standing army than we have today. We need an army that is small, effective and disciplined. It is true that the chief of staff has made great efforts to improve army discipline, and the situation at the present moment is not as it was a few years ago, but we are still facing a situation that should cause concern. We have to streamline the army, increase discipline, increase alertness and preparedness, and we must reduce its size. The need to reduce the army cannot be avoided.

[Schiffer] The former commander of the southern command pledges that the cuts can be introduced without damaging the army's capability.

[Sharon] This decision on defense budget cuts can only be done in a cabinet session, in this or some other cabinet form, since this involves a very serious consideration. One must be familiar with the defense system and be conscious of the different possibilities and alternatives.

[Schiffer] Minister Sharon, could you carry out this plan that you have presented to us?

[Sharon] Absolutely. Yes. I regret that I was not placed in a position to do so.

[Schiffer] And from here we pass on to another mine field, on which many people find themselves killed by their own mouth, concerning the relations between leading figures of the Likud and removing 'Ezer Weizman from the Herut Party.

Ari'el Sharon suggests a verbal armistice, stopping the disputes and the mutual slandering. Everyone had better keep the copies of his check book in his own pocket, he says, hinting at the fiery dispute between the two candidates of the Alignment for the premiership. [Words indistinct] Sharon believes that 'Ezer Weizman acted wrongly in voting for the nonconfidence motion against the government, and that his must not be treated with great seriousness.

[Sharon] One must keep an eye on the goals. Those who think Herut should return to its natural size, actually says let us return to opposition for 30 years. Yet Herut, in its capacity as the leading party in the Likud, has assumed responsibility for basic and important national objectives, which perhaps were not undertaken by any former government. These are the peace process and the settlement issue. These tasks should be completed.

We are witnessing developments in the rival party. We see the two main contenders who have already resorted to the most primitive weapons at their disposal. But I am positive that after the contest is over, they will eventually unite and will work together in the elections.

We are facing many tasks. This is why [words indistinct] along with expressing dissatisfaction, and dissatisfaction was justified, the Herut movement should have found a way to enable 'Ezer Weizman to continue his activity. After all, 'Ezer Weizman belongs to our camp. He does not belong to the camp of Bar-Lev, of Abba Eban and of Peres.

[Schiffer] And do you believe that Menahem Begin will succeed in leading the Likud to victory in the next elections?

[Sharon] Yes. Certainly. I believe that if we adequately organize for the elections, if Begin places emphasis on the central issues--and the central issues in Israel are its security and existence--if the movement prepares and acts as it should, I absolutely believe that under Prime Minister Menahem Begin's leadership the Likud certainly has reasonable chances of winning the elections.

[Schiffer] Neither Moshe Dayan nor 'Ezer Weizman insisted on safeguarding Israel's internal interests in the course of the negotiations with Egypt as did Begin, and occasionally Begin was alone in his struggle, says Ari'el Sharon. This must be the advent of the messiah!!! [End recording]

CHIEF OF STAFF ON BUDGET CUTS, EASTERN BORDER

TA271212 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Nov 80 pp 1, 2

[Report by Yo'el Marcus: "'The Defense Budget Cut Did Not Curb Inflation But It Did Damage Security'"]

[Text] Chief of Staff Lt Gen Raefa'el Eytan is vigorously opposed to new cuts in the defense budget and thinks that the previous budget cut of 8 billion Israeli pounds contributed nothing to the economy, did not curb wastage and inflation, and on the contrary caused real damage to the country's security. "We have less ammunition and the scope of training has been decreased."

Lieutenant General Eytan thinks that at a time when there is no economic policy that defines the aim and ways of action and sets a timetable, it is not helpful but harmful to attack the defense budget.

"No calculation can verify what was done with the money taken from us," the chief of staff told his confidants. "Prices have gone up, the cost of living index has jumped and the 1.5 billion Israeli pounds cut from the budget from the defense establishment was given to teachers--because it was impossible to resist them."

It is the chief of staff's opinion that, with the difficult situation, the government should declare an economic state of emergency: impose controls on foreign currency, freeze salaries and prices, do not unnecessarily increase the price of fuel, bring back subsidies, do not give benefits at the state's expense to anyone who is not doing national service and implement a drastic policy of control, utilize worker mobility, guarantee that salaries and benefits given to public employees should serve as an example, ban strikes in essential sectors and firmly insist on this. With regard to budgets, the chief of staff thinks that there is an alternative involved for each ministry: if the police budget is cut, there will be more thieves. If the Ministry of Education budget is cut, there will be more illiterates. But if they cut the Defense Ministry's budget, the country's existence will be in danger. Because of the reduction in reserve service activities, we must strengthen an efficient standing army. "The country's fate should not hang by a thread."

The chief of staff thinks that the Eastern Front could suddenly heat up. "They will begin firing at Israel in order to put an end to the dispute between themselves." We must be ready for any eventuality. The chief of staff, in an internal debate, said that the public did not know the financial cost of every terrorist who

did not succeed in infiltrating into Israel, how much money was being invested in sealing off a 700 km border as well as the sea and the fact that not a single terrorist infiltrates. But if a terrorist were to infiltrate into any settlement, millions of Israeli pounds would afterward be invested, without accounts, in establishing security fences and all the rest. Lieutenant General Eytan stated that an aerial photograph for intelligence requirements costs the IDF 10 million Israeli pounds. In such a costly war of existence the country must give up many things; it is impossible to maintain a standard of living like that of Europe.

In an internal debate the chief of staff stated that the salary component in government ministries represented 80 percent of the budget, while in the Defense Ministry the salary component was less than 50 percent. "But the country's salaries are not being harmed. When the defense budget is cut," the chief of staff said, "the amount of damage to the budget is fateful: in ammunition, fuel and fortifications. It is easy to harm this, but nobody is touching salaries." The chief of staff thinks that the defense budget is an impetus to the economy, not an inflationary factor. The defense budget also spurs on a giant industry whose exports total a billion dollars and which has developed items ranging from advanced radar systems to cast steel.

From the chief of staff's remarks it emerges that the defense establishment is starting an extensive campaign against further cuts to its budget, both in the budgetary year now ending and in the next one. Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz said that this time he did not intend to visit "BOR" (the operational command room of the general staff), this being after he admitted that on his last visit to "BOR" he compromised concerning the cuts in the defense budget.

CSO: 4805

SMALL ISRAELI POLITICAL FACTIONS AGAINST EARLY ELECTIONS

TA241139 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 24 Nov 80 p 2

[Yehoshu'a Bitzur report: "The Small Factions Are Not Interested in Early Elections"]

[Excerpt] The alignment is now entitled to submit its private draft motions to the Knesset about dissolving the Knesset and holding new elections as soon as possible, because this draft motion was already placed on the agenda 1 year ago by the late Yiga'el Allon and Moshe Shahal--long may he live. However, it is very doubtful that the alignment will be able to recruit a Knesset majority in favor of its immediate dissolution.

It is true that the coalition has now dropped to only 60 Knesset members, but most of the small factions who generally vote against the government--as they also did last week during the no confidence vote--are not interested in early elections at this stage, because they are not yet prepared for the election campaign. This applies particularly to Knesset members from the Oriental community who left the Likud, the Democrats and Sheli, such as Yitzhaq Yitzhaqi, Mordekhay Elgrably and Se'Adya Marciano. These members are now busy organizing their movements and are still looking for running mates before running for the Knesset elections.

At the same time, not one of the partners in the coalition camp is interested in holding the elections this spring. Under these circumstances it cannot be assumed that the alignment will succeed in getting together the 61 votes needed in the Knesset to gain a majority for a draft motion for the dissolution of the Knesset and the holding of new elections.

CSU: 4805

POLL SHOWS MAJORITY AGAINST EARLY ELECTIONS

TAD11317 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Dec 80 p 4

[Smith Institute Public Opinion Poll: "55 Percent Support Continued Tenure of Government--Until the Elections"]

[Text] While the Alignment continues its trend of increasing its advantage over the Likud, the eagerness and desire for the government's resignation faded a little during the 2 months that included the Knesset recess and the U.S. presidential elections. These findings appear in a poll commissioned by MA'ARIV.

In the poll, which was conducted in October-November, a small majority supported the continued tenure of the present coalition government, although many of these supporters made their support contingent upon the replacement of ministers. (See table 1.) These results were obtained before Moshe Dayan and 'Ezer Weizman voted with the opposition in a vote of confidence in the government.

In view of the relatively quite internal and external political situation that prevailed in the period when the poll was conducted, it is no wonder that a slight drop occurred in the public's wish to see the government resign. At the same time, the public is in fact hinting that it is not satisfied with many things in the current government. Despite this, however, it is in no hurry to replace it with a different government.

Naturally, one can argue that in a stable democracy such as Israel, in which everyone expects that every government will serve out its full term, one does not expect the people to favor the shortening of the government's term only because it is unsuccessful. In other democracies, governments that are unpopular for a lengthy period manage to recover and to regain the public's support until the elections. Could this not happen in Israel as well? The answer is, of course, yes. True, it may be argued that the 43 percent of the public that wants the government to resign is a high percentage, but more important is the fact that a considerable part of the support now enjoyed by the opposition--particularly the Alignment--in public opinion polls is soft, and these backers do not want early elections. It is also possible that this is a hint that many critics of the government still hope that it will improve.

The results indicate an improvement in the government's standing. It scored well in its activities relating to defense and foreign affairs, and there was a rise in the popularity of key ministers such as Shamir, Sharon, Levi and Burg. There

were less intense fears among the public concerning its economic future. Support grew for the government's positions on the settlements, and sharper opposition was expressed to territorial concessions for peace. To all these was added the stand favoring the government's continued tenure.

Despite all this, there is also another aspect: the popularity of Prime Minister Menahem Begin stood at 41 percent, but did not increase--and he, after all, is the key figure in the Likud. Moreover, the government did not gain any additional significant support through economic policy. Yigal Hurvitz was the focus of criticism, and his personal popularity fell, while criticism of his policy increased by leaps and bounds. In the latest poll, nearly half of those polled thought he would not succeed in curbing inflation and ameliorating the economy. Shimon Peres scored well for the manner in which he is fulfilling his duties.

The fact that domestic problems occupy first place on the public's scale of priorities is shown in the answers given to a new series of questions that were included in a poll commissioned by MA'ARIV and conducted by Hanokh Smith's Research Center. Interviewees were asked to give their views on four domestic issues upsetting them, and on four international issues they regard as important. (See table 2.)

It emerges that all eight issues worry the Israeli public. But three of the internal issues are in the first three places: inflation in Israel upsets 94 percent of those asked, with more than two-thirds replying that it is "very worrying." In second place comes the socioeconomic situation, with 87 percent "worried" or "very worried." This is followed by the issue of emigration.

The tiny majority the government won in the confidence vote on 19 November would seem to point to a resumption of tension on the domestic front. As the October-November poll indicates, the government embarked on this stage of Israeli politics with meager public support. Only the religious parties continue to enjoy the full support of their constituents, although it is not clear what the ramifications will be of the Abu-Hatzera affair.

As already noted, not everything points to a gloomy future for the coalition government: the standing of Prime Minister Begin has levelled off; the popularity of Yigal Hurvitz, even if it has been slightly eroded, is still higher than that of any finance minister since Pinhas Sapir; the settlement policy has wider support; and the public, even though it prefers the Alignment to the Likud, is not eager for a change.

Table 1--"Do you think that in the light of recent developments the government should carry on or resign?" (in percentages)

Date	Govt Should Continue as is Until Elections	Continue but Replace Some	Should Resign	No Opinion
Feb-March 1980	28	31	34	7
Aug-Sep 1980	30	17	48	5
Oct-Nov 1980	34	21	43	2

Table 2--"Which of the following issues worries you and which do not worry you?"
(in percentages)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Very Worrying</u>	<u>Worrying</u>	<u>Not Too Worrying</u>	<u>Not Worrying</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
1. The inflation in Israel	69	25	3	2	1
2. The socioeconomic situation in Israel	56	31	7	3	3
3. Increased emigration	58	24	6	8	4
4. Israel's world standing	42	37	10	8	3
5. Increased antisemitism in France and elsewhere	45	32	8	11	4
6. Decreased immigration to Israel	40	29	15	12	4
7. State of the peace negotiations and the autonomy talks	21	37	23	14	5
8. The Gulf War between Iran and Iraq	17	37	18	25	3

CSO: 4805

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON LEADING POLITICAL TEAMS

TA281121 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 28 Nov 80 p 1

[Public Opinion Poll: "The Leading Team Is the Determining Factor"]

[Text] The party's leading team is the most important factor in the public's decision on whom to vote for, but it is only slightly more important than the factor of the party's platform.

The Alignment leaders' team is considered to be more suitable than that of the Likud.

These findings emerge from the joint poll conducted by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research and the Communications Institute of the Jerusalem Hebrew University. The above issue was researched in November at the request of YEDI'OT AHARONOT.

The majority thinks that the platforms of the Alignment and the Likud differ on the question of foreign policy (65 percent) and primarily in economics (77 percent).

Question: When you decide for which party to vote, what is the most important factor in making your decision: the party's platform, the team leading the party, or your personal loyalty to it? (Answers in percentages.)

<u>The Leading Team</u>	<u>The Platform</u>	<u>Loyalty</u>
43	40	17

Question: When you consider the team of leaders from the Alignment and the Likud, which team, in your opinion, is more suitable to deal with the country's problems? (Answers in percentages.)

Foreign Policy

<u>Date</u>	<u>Alignment Team</u>	<u>Likud Team</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
March 1980	39	19	42
November 1980	42	17	41

Economics

March 1980	43	20	37
November 1980	43	13	44

POLL SHOWS SUPPORT FOR LIKUD DOWN TO 14 PERCENT

TA211302 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 Nov 80 p 22

[Hanokh Smith Election Forecast, "Support for the Likud Has Declined to 14 Percent--Just Like Herut's Strength in the 1960's--Although Satisfaction With the Government Has Increased"]

[Text] Despite the relative drop in political tension in Israel in the past 2 months (up to the end of this week), and the easing in the international arena following the U.S. presidential election, the growing support for the Alignment and the declining support for the Likud are continuing, as is shown by a MA'ARIV public opinion poll conducted by Smith's Research Center among a representative population sample during the final week of October and the first week of November. This poll covered over 1,200 Jews through the country, residing in all the various types of settlement: cities, development towns, kibbutzim and moshavin (see table 1).

If elections were held today, 42 percent of those polled would vote for the Alignment--2 percent more than in the poll conducted 2 months ago. Only 16 percent said they would vote for the Likud--2 percent less than in the previous poll. This is the first time the Alignment has led by 26 percent. The proportion of undecided voters stands at 24 percent.

Few changes turned up among those supporting other parties. Despite the "Abu-Hatzera Affair," support for the religious parties remains stable, and the same is true for the small parties: Sheli, the Civil Rights Movement, Shay and Tehiya, each of which obtained over 1 percent in the poll--the minimum quota figure for entering the Knesset. The Independent Liberals and Yiga'el Yadin's Democratic Movement have fallen considerably below the minimum quota. The proportion of undecideds is still high, totalling about one voter in every four.

The present poll represents the views of Jewish voters only. An adjustment of the results to cover the vote of the minorities, and a comparison of these corrected results with the voting patterns for the previous Knesset, turn up an interesting picture (see table 2).

The last poll showed that support for the Alignment had reached the level it stood at in 1973, even without taking into account the 23 percent who still had not decided who to vote for. Both the Likud and the other Jewish parties have lost considerable support since the 1977 elections. Of those who said they voted

Likud in 1977, only slightly more than 35 percent said they would vote Likud if elections were being held today. A further 25 percent said they would vote Alignment, while 23 percent are still undecided. About 9 percent of those who voted Likud in the past admitted that they are so disappointed that they would not vote at all if elections were held today.

The situation is even worse among those who supported the DMC. Only a marginal percentage of those sampled who had voted for the DMC in 1977 said they would vote for Yadin's Democrats if elections were held today, while just 5 percent said they would vote for Shay. The majority of these voters--over 58 percent--said they would vote for the Alignment, while a further 23 percent said they were still undecided.

Those who voted for the Alignment in 1977 are persisting in their support for that party. Nearly 90 percent of those who said they voted Alignment in 1977 would back it again if elections were held at this time, while the rest are still trying to make up their minds. Thus, despite the internal dispute over the leadership in the Labor Party, it continues to maintain its strength and is getting a growing number of voters from among those who voted for the Likud or for the DMC in the elections of 3 years ago. This just reinforces my evaluation--which was published in a previous series of articles in MA'ARIV--that in periods preceding an election campaign, support for the opposition parties is a function of the public's reaction to the ruling party or coalition, and is affected only slightly by the internal problems in the opposition parties.

At the same time, the continuing groundswell in the tendency of voters to shift from the Likud to the Alignment in the past 2 months--which were relatively quiet--is surprising not only in view of the acute squabbles within the Alignment itself, but also in the light of the public mood, as this was reflected in answers I received to other questions I put to those taking part in the survey.

Since the 1973 election, the Smith polls have presented a series of standard questions on the voters' estimation of the government's success. The percentage of those who believe the government has succeeded in its actions, or has largely succeeded in its various spheres of activity, is cited for each of the four last polls in reply to the question: "In your view, is the government succeeding or not succeeding in the following activities?" (See table 3)

It would appear that the answers we received in the latest poll indicate a growing view that the government is functioning better in certain spheres.

In the sphere of handling of defense matters the latest poll showed a considerable increase in those who believe that the government is succeeding, or succeeding in the main. Over two-thirds of those asked today believe that the government is succeeding in the main or is succeeding in this sphere. However, this change has not had a concrete effect on the public's general view of the government's success overall. In the period under discussion the main events in the defense sphere were successful IDF raids on terrorist bases in Lebanon. In its replies to this question, the public apparently expressed its support for and its satisfaction with these actions. This support would seem to be directed more toward the IDF than toward the government.

Similarly, there has been an increase in the percentage of those who believe the government has largely succeeded in the foreign policy sphere, though the actual proportion (27 percent) of those who think the government is succeeding was particularly low. This increase, too, had no effect on the public's overall view of the government.

It is possible that the improved evaluation of the government's operation is a function of the absence of any pressures as a result of the U.S. election campaign, and not necessarily because of any specific actions by the Israeli Government. This may, perhaps, explain the lack of the effect these enhanced viewpoints have had with respect to the voters' general opinion about the government's activity.

No change is discernible in the social or economic spheres. In both these areas only a small fraction of the population believes that the government is succeeding or succeeding in the main. The public's appraisal was heavily influenced by the August and September consumer price indices--which showed more moderate price rises than the recently published October index.

The ongoing low public appraisal of the government's dealing with the social and economic spheres is consistent with the generally low estimation of the government's success, as is reflected in the latest poll. The slight increase in the public's evaluation of the government's success--which stood at 18 percent--even if it is statistically insignificant, is interesting in itself, because this increase did not prevent the continued drop in the general support for the Likud within the coalition.

This poll must find an explanation for the ongoing decline in support for the Likud within the general atmosphere, which should have balanced it or perhaps even caused something of a recovery. We shall try to furnish these explanations in the coming articles.

The fact still remains that aside from the defense sphere, in which all Israeli governments have enjoyed public support, the present government continues to draw sharp public criticism in most spheres of its activity. The minor shifts from one poll to the next cannot blur this fact. The ongoing decrease in support for the Likud and the virtual disappearance of support for the DMC are living proof of the public's displeasure.

Table 1--How They Said They Would Vote (in percentages)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Likud</u>	<u>Alignment</u>	<u>Religious Parties</u>	<u>Other Parties</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
May 1979	26	33	13	8	20
Sept 1979	23	36	11	6	24
Feb-Mar 1980	20	37	11	6	26
Aug-Sept 1980	18	40	12	7	23
Oct-Nov 1980	16	42	12	6	24

Table 2--Comparison of Poll Results With 1973 and 1977 Elections (in percentages)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Likud</u>	<u>Alignment</u>	<u>Religious Parties</u>	<u>Other Parties</u>	<u>Arab Parties</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
Oct-Nov 1980 Poll	14	39	12	6	6	23
1973 Knesset Elections	30	40	12	12	6	-
1977 Knesset Elections	35	25	14	20	6	-

Table 3--Those Replying That the Government Is Succeeding or Largely Succeeding in its Actions (in percentages)

<u>Sphere</u>	<u>Sept 79</u>	<u>Feb-Mar 80</u>	<u>Aug-Sept 80</u>	<u>Oct-Nov 80</u>
Economic	11	18	14	14
Social	18	15	18	19
Defense	69	61	56	68
Foreign Affairs	44	31	20	27
General View of Govt	25	20	17	18

CSO: 4805

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON ISRAELI ARABS IMAGE

TA241208 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Nov 80 p 4

[Mina Tzemah Public Opinion Poll: "The Israeli Arab's Image Is Very Varied"]

[Text] From an interim report on a public opinion poll conducted by Dr Mina Tzemah on "The Positions of the Jewish Majority in Israel toward the Arab Minority," published yesterday by the Jerusalem Ven Leer Institute, it emerges that the inhabitants of Haifa and the north and the inhabitants of Beersheba and the south reveal a more positive attitude toward Arabs than do inhabitants of other towns and regions.

The findings also show that the image of the Israeli Arab is quite varied and there is no tendency to place him in the category of "black" or "white."

The poll covered 1,223 interviewees who were a representative section of the adult Jewish population of Israel. The data were collected in January 1980. About 50 percent of those interviewed tend to think that a large proportion of the Arabs (or even all of them) have a negative attitude toward the state of Israel and Jews. The view of the Arab attitude toward the state generally has no connection with the image of their personal traits--this was found by the poll--that is, the attitude toward their personal traits may be positive, while the view of their attitude toward the state of Israel is negative. (This finding reinforces the conclusion that their image is quite varied.)

Most of the people interviewed showed great willingness for personal contact with Arabs and 40 percent of those interviewed were prepared for close personal contact with Arabs (residence in the same building). More than 50 percent of those interviewed were prepared for contact with Arabs in the form of residence in the same town and various social events.

Among the following classes the number of people interviewed who were prepared for contact with Israeli Arabs reached 50 percent or more in at least 8 of the 10 possibilities for contact that were presented to them: people aged 10-41; people with the higher education; people born in Europe and America; second-generation Israelis of Western extraction; inhabitants of Jerusalem; inhabitants of Beersheba and the south; inhabitants of Haifa; and people who intend to vote for the Alignment.

About 50 percent of those interviewed support the general position favoring equal rights for Arabs, but when specific rights were mentioned, the percentage of people interviewed who supported equality dropped to about 40 percent. It was also found that concern for the country's security was the main factor motivating the Israeli public to support restrictions on the implementation of equal rights for Arabs. About 50 percent of those interviewed stressed an emotional distance from the Israeli Arabs and felt relief when they learned that people injured in accidents in Israel were Arabs, not Jews. It was also found that there is a direct link between the view of the Arabs' attitude toward the state of Israel and willingness for contact with them. The more positive the attitude was considered to be, the higher was the willingness for contact.

CSO: 4805

POLL ON HURVITZ POPULARITY, ECONOMIC SITUATION

TA301452 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 30 Nov 80 pp 1, 2

[Smith Institute Public Opinion Poll: "Only 18 Percent Think the Actions of the Government Are Successful"]

[Text] Approximately 18 percent of Israeli voters believe the government is successful--or mostly successful--in its actions. An exclusive public opinion poll conducted for MA'ARIV by the Smith Polling Institute does not indicate a change in the public's opinion about the government's general success or its performance on socioeconomic issues during the period of October-November 1980.

It emerges that 14 percent of the public believe the government is successful--or mostly successful--in its actions in the economic sphere whereas 19 percent believe the government is successful in the social sphere.

Undoubtedly, the key figure in the economic sphere is Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz. The appreciation for Prime Minister Menahem Begin's actions remains unchanged. It should also be noted that the prestige of several public figures, such as Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon, has risen. Among the ministers included in the poll, only Yiga'el Hurvitz has lost some of his popularity.

Table 1: "In your opinion, how does Yiga'el Hurvitz perform his duties as finance minister?" (Figures in percents)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>Very Bad</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
February-March 1980	18	26	21	22	13
August-September 1980	14	22	26	32	6
October-November 1980	12	20	29	35	4

In a poll conducted during February-March 1980, 44 percent expressed the opinion that Yiga'el Hurvitz performed his duties well or very well. This percentage declined to 36 percent in the poll conducted during August-September 1980 and to 32 percent in the latest poll, that is, an additional decrease of 4 percent. The number of those who thought Hurvitz performed his duties badly gradually increased to 35 percent during the October-November poll, that is, they exceeded the number of those who thought he performed his duties well.

Even among Hurvitz' critics, the majority thinks that he performs his duties better than his predecessors--Simha Ehrlich and the late Yehoshu'a Rabinowitz (only 10 to 15 percent thought they performed their duties well during their terms as finance ministers). Nevertheless, the decline in Hurvitz's popularity may be related to the decline in support for the Likud.

Appreciation for the minister is certainly connected to the success of his policy.

Table 2: "Do you think that Finance Minister Hurvitz will succeed in curbing inflation and healing the economy?" (Figures in percents)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Will Succeed</u>	<u>Will Partially Succeed</u>	<u>Will Not Be That Successful</u>	<u>Will Fail</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
February-March 1980	18	32	18	19	13
August-September 1980	10	25	21	36	8
October-November 1980	10	22	19	46	3

A dramatic change has occurred in the situation since February-March 1980. At that time, about half of those interviewed thought Hurvitz would succeed--at least partially--while only 9 percent thought he would fail. In the last poll, only 32 percent expressed the opinion that he would succeed--at least partially--in performing his duties, whereas 42 percent thought that he would fail. The difference between the current poll and the one conducted 2 months ago does not necessarily lie in the fact that there has been a 3 percent decline in the number of those who think Hurvitz will be partially successful but in the 10 percent increase in the number of those who think he will fail. It should also be noted that this was also the prevalent opinion before the 11 percent rise in the October index was published.

Another element reflecting the public's opinion about the economic situation is the feeling regarding its present and future economic prosperity. In the last poll, only 15 percent expressed the opinion that their living conditions had improved compared to last year; 38 percent said their living conditions were identical to those of last year and 30 percent said there had been a slight decline in living conditions. These conclusions are compatible with current statistical data generally indicating a slight decline in family living conditions.

As for the future: Only 14 percent think their living conditions will rise next year; 39 percent think they will remain unchanged; 28 percent believe they will decline slightly and 19 percent are convinced there will be a significant decline in living conditions.

These percentages are very similar to the conclusions of the previous poll on the same issue. In other words, the public generally believes next year will be similar to last year and there will be a slight decline in living conditions.

Amazingly enough, evaluations about the economic situation during October-November 1980 were more optimistic than those during February-March 1980. This means that the public's concern for the economic sphere as expressed in the October-November 1980 poll is more dependent on the success or failure of Hurvitz' policy than on a feeling of real or possible deprivation of the economic sphere.

Another Likud minister and key figure in the socioeconomic sphere is Construction and Absorption Minister David Levi. In the poll conducted during October-November 1980, 42 percent said Levi performs well. This is a 5 percent increase compared to the August-September 1980 poll. Levi's prestige has relatively risen while Hirvitz's popularity has declined. However, no significant importance should be attached to this fact because the rise in the public's appreciation for Levi is absolutely incompatible with the decline in the public's support for the Likud whereas the decline in Hurvitz's popularity is largely connected to the deterioration of the Likud's stand.

Whereas the Likud's image has been apparently tarnished by the failing economic policy the religious parties were affected by other difficulties, particularly in the wake of the Abu-Hatzera investigation affair. Minister Abu-Hatzera has, at least temporarily, been dealt a heavy blow. In the October-November 1980 poll, only 11 percent said he performed his duties well as minister for religious affairs whereas 45 percent said he performed badly, and 35 percent refrained from voicing their opinion. Never has any minister, except for the finance minister, been given such a low rating.

Has the Abu-Hatzera affair had any affect on the support for the religious parties or other religious ministers? The answer is that apparently there has been no real or general effect. The rate of the potential vote for the religious parties has not at all diminished, according to the October-November 1980 poll.

The public was also asked to evaluate the performance of interior minister and chairman of the ministerial committee for the autonomy affairs Dr Yosef Burg. In the October-November 1980 poll 40 percent of those polled said Minister Burg performed his duties well compared with 39 percent who had expressed the same opinion in a poll conducted in September 1979, at a time when the government was more popular than today.

An outraged public could have directed its accumulated anger because of the Abu-Hatzera affair at the leader of his party but it did not do so: instead, Burg joined Shamir, Sharon and Levi in the line of ministers whose activities have gained more appreciation compared to previous polls.

Surprising conclusions were also registered in the opposition camp. In the lapse between the last two public opinion polls, Yitzhaq Rabin also became a candidate for the Labor Party's leadership and the rival of the current leader, Shim'on Peres. The open confrontation has had direct and positive implications on Peres' popularity. In the poll conducted during August-September 1980 33 percent thought that Peres was a good or very good opposition leader. This rate increased by 8 percent in the October-November 1980 poll and reached 41 percent who said he was a good or very good leader. Nevertheless, the improvement in Peres' image should be interpreted cautiously. People will probably be tempted to compare the Peres-Rabin confrontation to the race between Kennedy and Carter before and after Kennedy decided to run for the Democratic Party's nomination. However, circumstances are totally different and the Israeli system for electing the candidates is altogether different from the American system.

One may conclude from the poll that there has indeed been a change but it still remains unclear. The improvement in Peres' image indicates that the public thinks

Peres is doing as good a job as leader of the opposition as Begin does as prime minister. This is actually the only similar point, since Begin and his cabinet are the ones in power whereas Peres is the leader of the opposition and has to make do with the satisfaction emerging from the rise in the public's appreciation for his party--as reflected in public opinion polls--1 year before the Knesset election.

It will emerge from the next article in this series that a slight majority of the public does not yet favor the resignation of the current government.

CSU: 4805

POLL SHOWS SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT HAS DOUBLED

TA281625 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Nov 80 p 19

[Eighth article in an "Election Forecast" series by pollster Hanokh Smith: "The Rate of Supporters of Settlements and of Ari'el Sharon Has Doubled; At the Same Time the Rate of Those Prepared for a Compromise in Judaea and Samaria Has Diminished"]

[Text] While the support for the Likud continued to drop, according to our latest poll conducted in the last week of October and the first week of November, the support for the Likud leader, Prime Minister Menahem Begin, remained steady (see table No 1). Actually, the percentage of those who thought Begin was fulfilling his function as prime minister well tended to remain stable in all three polls conducted this year, while the support for his party continued to decline.

It is noteworthy, however, that there was a steep decline in the percentage of voters who believed that the prime minister was functioning well between May 1979 and February-March 1980 (a drop from 59 to 40 percent; a 19 percent decline). At the same time the support for the Likud dropped by 6 percent (from 26 to 20 percent among Jewish voters). It should be noted that before 1979 over 59 percent believed Begin was fulfilling his duties well.

Table No 1--Is Menahem Begin functioning well or very well as prime minister? (Figures in percentages)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Begin Functions Well As a Prime Minister</u>	<u>Will Vote For Coalition Party</u>	<u>Will Vote For Likud</u>
May 1979	59	40	26
Sep 1979	53	35	23
Feb-Mar 1980	40	31	20
Aug-Sep 1980	41	30	18
Oct-Nov 1980	41	28	16

In spite of the fact that Begin's popularity with the public declined, the percentage of those who still think that he fulfills his duties as prime minister well is much higher than the percentage of those who intend to vote for the Likud or for another coalition party. Begin is, therefore, seen as the central political power in the coalition government, and he is doubtlessly its main asset in the elections.

This is particularly striking after Moshe Dayan and 'Ezer Weizman, both of whom were very popular in their offices as foreign minister and defense minister, have left the government.

It is interesting, nevertheless, that several ministers received higher ratings than in previous polls. First among them is Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, who won the support of 33 percent of the respondents, who thought that he was functioning well in his job. This is a steep rise from the 20 percent rating given him in a previous poll 2 months ago. It constitutes significant progress for him, which was achieved with the help of a considerable portion of those who had previously been undecided (a decline from 40 to 25 percent of the voters). The support for Shamir is not as extensive as that of former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, who enjoyed the support of two thirds of all the Jewish voters. They believed he was carrying out his duties as foreign minister very well, even in May 1979.

Another man for whom public support has increased is Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon. In the poll conducted in October-November 37 percent thought he was functioning well. The broadest support for him previously was 26 percent in February-March 1980. Ari'el Sharon remains a controversial figure on the Israeli political scene: the number of those who are critical of him is as large as the number of those who support him. In the latest poll 31 percent of the respondents replied that he was not doing a good job as agriculture minister (as opposed to 40 percent who thought so in the February-March poll).

Along with his office as the agriculture minister Ari'el Sharon is the moving force behind the settlements in the administered territories. It is hard to know with certainty on which of Sharon's functions the voter is basing his opinion. Yet, because of Sharon's central role in the settlement issue, one may assume that the majority of the public judge him on the basis of this issue. We may assume, then, that the growing support for Sharon is related to an increasing support for the settlement policy, which is connected with him.

In the August-September poll I wrote that there had been a process of growing extremism in the attitude of the Israeli voter on the issue of settlement in the occupied territories and the territorial concessions that should be granted to Jordan in exchange for the peace treaty. The poll conducted in October-November indicated that there has been further extremization in public opinion, as can be observed in table No 2.

Table No 2--Settlement in Judaea and Samaria; which of the following stances is closest to yours? (Figures in percentages)

<u>Stance</u>	<u>Oct-Nov 1980</u>	<u>Aug-Sep 1980</u>	<u>Feb-Mar 1980</u>
Gush Emunim, Sharon: Extensive settlement	28	22	14
'Ezer Weizman: Controlled settlement in large blocks	15	19	20

	<u>Oct-Nov 1980</u>	<u>Aug-Sep 1980</u>	<u>Feb-Mar 1980</u>
Stance of part of opposition: Settlement only in strategic, non-settled regions	23	20	21
Opposing new settlements: Favoring strengthening of the existing settlement in territories	9	11	9
Opposing new settlements while the peace talks continue	12	14	21
Other opinions	1	1	4
No opinion	12	13	11

From this data one may infer that the percentage of voters who support the Gush-Emunim Sharon stance on settlement in the territories has doubled since February-March 1980 (from 14 to 28 percent).

The most significant decline was in the number of those who supported the position that no new settlements should be set up during peace talks. This position has lost an increasing number of votes, from 21 to 12 percent at present.

A close examination of the table shows a clear and continued change from the stance advocating the restriction of settlement in one way or another to the stances held by Gush Emunim and Sharon. This data should be treated with caution. However, Gush Emunim-Sharon supporters are still a minority of Jewish voters, although this is a considerable minority.

It is also difficult to analyze the support for Weizman. While Weizman was very active when previous polls were conducted, it is hard to know now whether the support for Weizman now is part of the support for the government, or comes from those opposed to it. In other words, the choices of alternative policy lines expressed in the February-March poll do not mean the same thing now, particularly as far as Weizman is concerned.

Moreover, the various opposition stances still enjoy significant support, although the total support for these three alternative stances has declined from 51 to 44 percent.

Further evidence of the extremization of Israeli stances on vital policy issues is connected to territorial concessions to Jordan, if Jordan agrees to peace with Israel. The question was: Are you willing to cede territories in exchange for peace with King Husayn and Jordan, as with al-Sadat and Egypt? If yes, which territories? The results were: some 91 percent of the Jewish voters in this poll answered that they objected to any territorial compromise in East Jerusalem,

which is identical with the percentage of those who held this opinion in the previous August-September poll. The decision on this issue remained as it was: unanimous. But regarding other administered areas a number of changes have been observed (see table No 3).

Table No 3--"In exchange for peace with King Husayn and with Jordan, as has been made with al-Sadat and Egypt, are you willing to restore settlements? Which?"
(Figures in percentages)

	<u>Date</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Only Part</u>	<u>Everything</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
Judea, Samaria	Aug-Sep	50	37	10	3
	Oct-Nov	57	33	9	1
Gaza	Aug-Sep	38	21	37	4
	Oct-Nov	44	19	35	2

There is a marked increase in the number of people who are unwilling to cede territory in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza in exchange for peace with Jordan. This rate roughly corresponds to the increase in the support for Sharon and Gush Emunim on the settlement question. A clear but not decisive majority prefers not to make territorial concessions to Jordan in exchange for peace; while a clear, but small majority is willing to cede at least part of the Gaza Strip in return for peace. The difference in the stances on Judea and Samaria on the one hand, and Gaza on the other, is related to the more confident attitude toward Gaza, which is geographically close to Egypt, a country that enjoys greater credibility in Israel, in everything related to the peace process, than does Jordan.

To sum up, although there is an extremization in the attitude of Israelis on these two issues, the nation is still divided, and it is difficult to reach a consensus.

It is perhaps surprising that despite the clear extremization on the settlement issue and the issue of territorial concessions in exchange for peace with Jordan, support for Mr Begin as prime minister did not increase, and support for the Likud continued to go down. As a matter of fact, those who enjoy the most public support are Sharon and Shamir.

The solution to this riddle lies perhaps in the order of priorities: as already pointed out, despite the large support for the government on foreign affairs and security issues, no such support was seen in economic and social areas. This low support is closely related to the low degree of government popularity. These aspects will be examined in the next series of articles.

CSO: 4805

BANNED ARAB NAZARETH CONFERENCE DISCUSSED

TA031333 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Dec 80 p 7

[Commentary by Yo'el Dar: "The Order--In the Face of Political Erosion"]

[Text] Prime Minister Menahem Begin, in his capacity as defense minister, has put an end to the guessing about whether the "Congress of Israel's Arabs," which was scheduled to be held on 6 December in Nazareth, would in fact take place. The question now being asked is how the 80 members of the organizing committee--among them 25 council heads, four Knesset members and other Muslim, Christian and Druze public figures--will react. Will they accept the decision or will they launch a legal and public struggle which will perforce lead to an exacerbation in the relations between the country's Arab population and the government (and indirectly with the Jewish population)?

Ever since the outlawing of the Al-Arad group's attempt to organize in the early 60's, no attempt has been made to prevent Arab assemblies, to restrict their political moves, or to take legal measures against the organizers of the various protest meetings that take place every few months. Both the "Progressive National Movement" and the "Sons of the Village," which are considered the most extremist elements among the Israeli Arabs, enjoy complete freedom of action. The ban on the Nazareth meeting is more significant than the outlawing of Al-Arad, because the latter represented a fairly small group of Arab intellectuals, whereas behind the organizers of the Nazareth conference are the half of the Arab population that voted for Rakah, along with hundreds of Arabs who had never before identified with Rakah.

There are those who maintain that the entire initiative for the congress came solely to augment Rakah's strength for the forthcoming Knesset elections. Proof of this, they say, is that most members of the organizing committee are connected with Rakah in one way or another, and the so-called 6th of June Charter was drawn up by Rakah theoreticians and printed by a communist printing firm.

Others, however, point out that even if the initiative did come from Rakah, the fact is that Arab public figures who have never belonged to Rakah took part in the preparatory meetings or expressed solidarity with the congress' objectives. The participants in the preparatory meeting at Shefar'am, less than 3 months ago, included: Mk Hamad Abu-Rabi'a, who is affiliated with the Alignment; the Kadi of 'Addo and Haifa Shaykh Muhammad (Hubayshi); and the head of the Mi'ilya village local council, Elias (Liyus). Shefar'am Mayor Ibrahim Nizar Husayn was also a

signatory to the invitation to the preparatory meeting; however, he did not show up, and it is still not clear whether this was because of differences of outlook he had with the organizers or because his name was erroneously included on the list of sponsors.

The prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs, Binyamin Gur-arye, spent the past few weeks feeling the pulse of the moderate--or what is termed the "positive"--Arab population. He and his aides held many public meetings in the Arab villages and spoke with various persons, who seem not to have been convinced of the meeting's grave nature. Many Arab notables, under increasing pressure from the radical circles, evaded any clear reply about whether they intended to take part in the meeting.

The initiative had its birth a few months ago under the influence of the communist intellectual Emil Touma and Rakah members. Some 100 Arab public figures drew up a document, which they called the 6th of June Charter. Divided into several chapters, this document deals with the relations between the Arabs of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. It states, among other points, that the Arabs of Israel are an integral part of the Palestinian Arab people. The document also asserts that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian Arabs in Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Judaea and Amaria and the Gaza Strip but does not represent the Arabs living in Israel. (In my view, this contention is pretty insubstantial, for who will believe that the PLO and not King Husayn represents the Palestinians, who make up over 50 percent of Jordan's population? Who do a quarter-million Palestinian need Yasir 'Arafat and George Habash and not their own rulers? If this be the case, is it logical that precisely the Arabs of Israel should be represented by their own elected representatives? After all, both the Palestinians in Jordan and in the other Arab countries have their elected representatives. Why can Tawfiq Zayyad represent Palestinians in Nazareth, while the heads of the governments in Jordan, most of whom are Palestinians, cannot represent their own people who live in the Hashemite Kingdom?)

In another section of the document its authors demand equal rights; they demand that the Interior Ministry increase the grants to the Arab local authorities and recognize their standing as a national minority. At the Nazareth conference the organizers had intended to elect a body that would represent all the Israeli Arabs, a kind of supreme committee to serve as their elected and recognized representatives. This body would speak in the name of all the Arabs living in Israel, whether they are Rakah members or potential Alignment or Likud voters.

The political erosion among the Arabs of Israel began in the final year of Shmu'el Toledano's tenure as the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs. It was in these years that the ideological framework was created for the first Arab congress. This was when the body called the Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils was formed and when the Democratic Front was created among the Arabs. Then came "Land Day" and other events that strengthened radical elements such as the "Sons of the Village" and the Democratic Front.

In that period any Arab organizing was written off, the argument being that it posed no threat. In the past 3 years more attention has been paid to events in the Arab sector, and things are called by their name. At the same time, however, those who banned the Nazareth congress must seriously weigh the problems confronting the country's Arab citizens and consider how to help those who wish to be a part of the country, as well as how to prevent any worsening of relations between Jews and Arabs. If no serious action is taken, the result will be the erasure of the green line and the growing identification of Israel's Arabs with the national aspirations of their brethren in Nabulus, Janin and Ramallah.

BRIEFS

BORDER POLICE STATIONED AT NEGEV--A border police patrol company was stationed at the third Negev airfield site in Tel Malhata--between Beersheba, Dimona and 'Arad--a few weeks ago. Border police forces conduct regular patrols 24 hours a day over the 62,000 dunams of the airfield. The company is accommodated in houses constructed specifically for that purpose near the building site. Its forces are to prevent the expected Bedouin objection to the infrastructure work at the site and to remove them from the area. During the night border policemen patrol around the site's heavy equipment to prevent sabotage acts. The border police company was transferred to Tel Malhata following an incident during which three agriculture ministry surveyors were attacked by dozens of Bedouin while they were marking the area. It has been reported that the possibility of transferring the border police staff to the Dimona absorption center is being looked into. The center is currently vacant and has 60 buildings, some occupied by "black Hebrews." The rest of the buildings will be renovated by the police and the Dimona municipality for the border policemen. [Text] [Report by Buqi Na'e: "Border Police Forces Have Been Stationed at a Negev Airfield"] [TA041158 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 4 Dec 80 p 6]

NAZARETH RALLY INTENTIONS--Mk Tawfiq Tubi has said that the PLO does not represent the Israeli Arabs. The representatives of the Israeli Arabs are their Knesset members, he said. He emphasized that the Israeli Arabs are living in conditions different from those in which Palestinians in other countries live. Tubi confirmed that it was the goal of the Nazareth Conference to urge the government to recognize the PLO. He claimed that this is a position acceptable to many Jews in Israel as well as on some Knesset parties and most of the countries of the world. Our Knesset correspondent Tzvi Yisre'eli noted that Tubi's remarks came in reaction to charges made against the organizers of the Nazareth Conference, alleging that they regard the PLO as their representative. [Text] [TA031425 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 3 Dec 80]

SAUDIS BEHIND TURKISH DECISION--It was Saudi pressure that motivated the Turkish Government to reduce the level of its representation in Israel, thus compelling Israel to reduce the level of its own representation in Ankara. This is the prevailing view in Jerusalem following an official announcement on this matter published yesterday in Turkey. Ever since Turkey decided, some months ago, to move its consulate from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv (in the wake of passage of the Jerusalem Law), political circles in Israel have followed the intentions of the Ankara government with respect to its relations with Israel. The change of regime in Turkey aroused the hope that there would be no further exacerbation in the

relations between the two countries, but the past few days showed that this was a vain hope. Following a visit by the Turkish foreign minister to Saudi Arabia last week, the Ankara government informed Israel of its intention to cut back its representation in Tel Aviv to the level of second secretary only. The Turkish Government suggested that this decision be played down, and Israel agreed. Jerusalem was surprised yesterday when Turkey issued an official communique on this decision. [Excerpt] [TA031157 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Dec 80 p 2]

SPRAY USED AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS--The security forces will use a new spray in Judaea and Samaria to disperse demonstrations. A decision on this was made after it became clear that the use of tear gas was not sufficiently effective. Security sources said last night that the new spray does not affect the lungs, but is more effective than tear gas in the sense that it causes the crowd to flee the area and makes them incapable of further rioting or demonstrating. The need for this spray arose after it became evident that the pupils in Judaea and Samaria had developed methods of defense against tear gas. After a few minutes, as the gas dispersed, they would assemble again and continue their disturbances. Besides the use of this spray, which is designed to stun the pupils but not to injure them, the security forces have decided to hold teachers partially responsible for disturbances. It emerges that those educators who receive their wages from the military government are the very ones who encourage the pupils to demonstrate and riot against the military government. [Text] [TA011144 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Dec 80 p 16]

ARAB EMIGRATION DECREASING--The number of young Arabs from East Jerusalem, Judaea and Samaria who left the area for good over the last 13 years is much less than the number of people who entered the area during the same period in the framework of unification of families. Arab sources reported yesterday that there was emigration movement by young people from East Jerusalem and the West Bank during the Jordanian rule, but since the end of the 6-day war, it has decreased because of Israel's presence in the area and with the sharpening of the Palestinian problem. Governmental and security sources last night confirmed that from year to year the "emigration consciousness" among the Arabs of East Jerusalem and the West Bank is decreasing. [Text] [TA281127 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Nov 80 p 3]

FRANCE COMPETING FOR AIRCRAFT PURCHASE--Paris--Bolivia is now examining possibilities of purchasing a 24-craft "KFIR" squadron and is about to send a delegation of army personalities to Israel and some European countries to pursue this matter. The alternatives Bolivia has are to purchase the "Jaguar," a French-British coproduction, or the French "Mirage-3." Accounts reaching Paris claim that this has been reported by the Bolivian commander of the air force. French sources have claimed that Israel has an advantage in the competition because it is offering spare parts for the French "Mirages" as part of the "package deal." (Many Latin American countries employ Mirage aircraft in their air forces.) The DAVAR correspondent added that the Carter administration embargoed military sales to Bolivia last summer after the army had taken brutal control of the country. This happened a few days prior to the scheduled swearing in ceremony of the president, who was elected in a democratic manner. In the first few weeks after the coup hundreds of people were murdered, including trade union activists and leaders of the democratic parties. [Text] [TA041136 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Dec 80 p 1]

SOUTHERN SINAI DEVELOPMENT CONTINUES--Even though all of Sinai is to be evacuated, the government is spending 1 million Israeli shekels on settlement and infrastructure in the region. The treasury has asked approval [from the Knesset's finance committee] to transfer over 1 million shekels from the 1979 budget surplus to cover expenditures made this year within the framework of previous commitments. Of this sum, 441,000 shekels were from the regular budget and 612,000 shekels were from the development budget. The money is earmarked for the development of the southern Sinai district, the development of highways and road, and infrastructure work in Ofira and Na'Ama. [Excerpt] [TA031215 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Dec 80 p 3]

13 SEATS FOR DAYAN-LED FACTION--If the Rafi faction were to leave the Likud and contest the general elections on its own, headed by Moshe Dayan, Yiga'el Hurvitz and Zalman Shoval, it could win--as of mid-November--about 10 percent of the vote, or 13 Knesset seats. This emerged from the monthly public opinion poll conducted by Dr Mina Tzema, director of the Dahaf Agency's Research Institute, for the weekly QESAFIM. Ultimately, this list would gain most of its seats--seven--at the Alignment's expense; along with two from the Likud, one each from the NRP and Tehiya, and the rest at the expense of the other parties. As will be recalled, the October poll showed that without Moshe Dayan an independent Rafi list would be able to win just three seats--the same number it has in the current Knesset. The ongoing election forecast for November--according to data collected before Weizman's expulsion from Herut and before the L'Express affair--shows a slight rise for the Alignment and a drop for the Likud, as compared with October: Alignment--63 seats (61 in October); Likud--26 (29); NRP--8 (8); Orthodox--6 (5); Tehiya--3 (2); others--13 (14). However, as the earlier polls showed, if the Alignment were headed by Yitzhaq Rabin it would get more seats than it would under the present leadership--66 seats in the November forecast, identical to the number in the previous poll. [Text] [TA011135 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 1 Dec 80 p 1]

POPULATION FIGURES--The government statistician, Dr Moshe Sigron, today reported the latest statistics for the population of Israel. These included the fact that Israel's population is approaching 4 million. About 3.9 million are citizens of whom about 3.25 million are Jews. The population of Israel is expected to rise above 4 million next year and by the year 2000 there will be about 5.5 million people in Israel. The official annual of statistics is to be published tomorrow. [Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 1 Dec 80]

SOVIET DROPOUTS--The increase in dropouts from the Soviet Union continued in November. The HA'ARETZ correspondent has learned that during that month the dropout rate among those leaving the Soviet Union reached 74 percent; 789 Jews received exit permits, but 581 of them dropped out in Vienna. Additional data show that in November the Soviet authorities granted the lowest number of exit permits in 2 years, apart from Last August. This data is arousing concern among immigration authorities because it proves that the Soviet authorities are cutting down considerably on the number of immigrants. [Text] [TA030632 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Dec 80 p 1--report by Yosi Melman, London, 1 Dec]

UNEMPLOYMENT IN NOVEMBER--The number of people who sought employment in November totaled 38,500, about 2,000 people less than in October. The demand for workers by employers increased by 500 compared with October. The number of people unemployed for 6 days or more remained stable at 14,000. Our correspondent Jon Feder notes that for the first time in 4 months there has been a decrease in the number of people seeking employment because of the demand for seasonal workers in agriculture. [TA041352 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 4 Dec 80]

JUDAEA, SAMARIA CLINICS--The Israeli sick fund established eight new clinics in the Samaria settlements beyond the Green Line in the last 2 weeks. Four more are in the planning stages. The clinics were opened in Qedumim, Elon More, Sal'it, Ari'el, Elqana, Qarne Shomron, Ma'ale Shomron and Neve Zuf, with the one in Qedumim serving as a regional clinic for the Samaria settlements. More Kupat Holim clinics are expected to be established throughout Samaria soon. In October and November, Kupat Holim established 17 clinics in Samaria, the Galilee and the new outposts in the Galilee. [TA041352 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1440 GMT 3 Dec 80]

COAL DEPOSITS--Large lignite deposits have been found in the Hula Valley. The coal can be used as raw material for the production of electricity. There are about half a billion tons of lignite in the Hula Valley and this is sufficient to operate a power station to supply about 600 megawatt in 30 to 40 years. However, it will take 10 to 12 years to get the project moving. [TA040713 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 3 Dec 80]

DATA ON EXPORTS--The net export of goods in November 1980 totalled \$404 million in current prices; \$363 million in industrial exports and \$41 million in agricultural exports. This was a 2 percent increase over November 1979. The net value of the exports in November 1980--seasonally deducted and without diamonds, ships and planes--was down 23 percent from October. In the first 11 months of 1980 net exports totalled \$4,689 million, an increase of 22 percent over the parallel period last year, when exports totalled \$3,853 million. Industrial exports (without diamonds) were up by 29 percent, diamond exports by 17 percent and agricultural exports by 6 percent. [TA040713 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Dec 80 p 8]

NEW KFIR MODEL--The Israel aircraft industries has developed a 2-seat KFIR aircraft for training. The craft has room for the trainer and the student and is already used by the Israel Air Force. This model differs from previous KFIR models primarily in the nose, which has been significantly lengthened. The longer nose together with the additional space for another pilot necessitated changes in the aircraft's center of gravity and its shape. [Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 27 Nov 80]

ADDITIONAL LAND FOR SETTLEMENTS--The council of the Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria demands that the government start an operation to double the number of Jews living beyond the Green Line. The council has prepared a project to build 3,000 housing units in the area and it requests that the government implement this low cost housing project, as has recently been done in Ma'ale Adumim. Our correspondent on settlement affairs has learned that an additional tens of thousand dunams was recently approved for these settlements. This addition was done from lands that are not privately owned and are to be found near these settlements, although they are not always contiguous with the settlements. The settlements whose territory will increase as a result of this decision are mainly Elqana, Ari'el, Qarne Shomron and Giv'on. [Text] [TA300643 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 30 Nov 80]

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

CABINET RESHUFFLE PREDICTED--Well-informed Jordanian sources have told AL-WATAN that a cabinet reshuffle will take place in Jordan that may involve six portfolios, including the Foreign Ministry to which Hasan Ibrahim, minister of occupied territories affairs, is expected to return as successor to Marwan al-Qasim, who may be appointed ambassador to an important capital. The sources said that among the portfolios possibly involved in the shakeup is that of Jordanian Minister of Transport 'Ali Suhaymat who expressed the desire to leave the cabinet because of his private business, particularly construction and engineering work in Saudi Arabia, which brings him a high income. The reshuffle also includes Minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs Kamil al-Sharif. The reshuffle is expected to be announced shortly, after Prime Minister Mudar Badran completes the reshuffle arrangements. [Text] [LD021705 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 30 Nov 80 pp 1, 11]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

NEW LONDON PURCHASE--London (KUNA)--Financial sources said here Friday that the Kuwait Investment Office in London has raised its share in the commercial insurance union, which is one of the biggest British insurance companies. The KIO has purchased 200,000 shares to raise the value of its shares in the Union to about five per cent. [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 1 Nov 80 p 1]

NEW POWER PLANT--Kuwait will have a new power and desalination plant by 1985, official sources told KUWAIT TIMES yesterday. They said work on the plant to be set up in the Gleia area, south of Kuwait city, would begin soon. Several batches of Pakistani workers had already been recruited to begin the project which would help meet the country's needs of power and water. The sources said that only three of the country's six power generating plants were now operational. The South Shueibah power station which was damaged earlier this year was now being overhauled. The sources said the coming months would be ideal for the work on the damaged units as the plant's load would come down considerably as power consumption declines in winter. The sources said Kuwait's current power output stood at 2,550 megawatts. Doha accounted for 1,050, South Shuaiba 800, North Shuaiba 400 and Shuweikh 300. They said the country's need during this month would not exceed 2,200 megawatts. The work on damaged units were expected to be completed before the advent of summer, they added. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 4 Nov 80 p 1]

VISIT BAN--The ban imposed with effect from Oct. 1 on entry visas and visit cards to Kuwait has not affected recruitments by the government and public sector, Assistant Undersecretary for Nationality, Passports and Residence, Suleiman al-Mesh'an, said yesterday. "Procedures concerning residence permits are carried out normally as long as it serves the interest of the national economy," he said. He stressed that the ban affected only private visits to the country by relatives of the working expatriates, but pointed out that it was only temporary. "The ban holds pending a reassessment of the situation," he said. [Text]

DESALINATION PLANS--Manufacturers of water desalination units may soon find themselves bidding for a large, and final, contract in Kuwait. The Finance Ministry and four semi-public financial institutions last week incorporated the Kuwait Company for Manufacturing Seawater Desalination Units, which will produce the technology locally, rather than importing it. The firm plans to sign the contract before the end of next month to acquire the necessary basic technology from a foreign firm. Among those under consideration are IHI of Japan and Weir Westergarth of Britain, reports from Kuwait said. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 p 15]

REFINERY BIDS--The Government of Kuwait has set a December 15 deadline for pre-qualifying bids for a contract to modernise and more than double the capacity of its Old Topping refinery at Mena Abdullah, it was announced last week. The Kuwait National Petroleum Company is still working on the final details of the modernisation programme, but it is known that it plans to increase capacity from 110,000 a day to 250,000 b/d. The project, which is expected to be tendered this year, is also likely to include several processing units; these should include crude distillation, vacuum distillation, residue conversion, process-cooking, hydrocracking, fluid catalytic cracking, hydrotreating and H₂ manufacturing. The contract will also cover construction of ancillary buildings and facilities for the refinery, which was owned by the US oil company Aminoil until its nationalisation in 1977. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 pp 15, 16]

CSO: 4820

POLITICAL, MILITARY CONFLICT SAID TO BE IMMINENT

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 11-17 Aug 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Nahad al-Mashnuq: "Sarkis Has Crossed the Red Line, and Talk of Rounds of Fighting Has Resumed; The War of Explosion!"]

[Text] "The country is approaching a political and military conflict."

So say many observers. Some people almost go so far as to specify the time and place of the eruption, and some feel that President Sarkis is responsible.

As the different rounds of the Lebanese war unfolded and intersected during the turbulence of the past 2 years, the crowds of journalists became more cohesive and less widely distributed among the politicians. The journalists became largely restricted to specific centers in the two areas of Beirut: in east Beirut, where former president Kamil Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre Jumayyil--along with former president Sulayman Franjiyyah--focused political activity in the presidential palace in B'abda; and in west Beirut, which was the headquarters for the late Kamal Junblat, former prime minister Sa'ib Salam and Dean Raymond Iddih. The latter converted his home into a permanent headquarters for journalists and a broadcasting center for news concerning political meetings and contacts.

At the beginning of the war, the journalists were interested in knowing what the future held. Would the war stop after the second or third round or would it continue? The opinions, speculations and prophecies multiplied, and the smallest public matter was interpreted as either a negative or a positive sign until the picture became confused and no one was able to hold on to the thread of the truth any longer.

Meanwhile, then prime minister Rashid Karami had issued an official statement denying the speculations of a new round of fighting which were circulating at the time and had reached the pages of the newspaper. He said that speculations were the "foolish talk of agents and traitors." Dean Raymond Iddih uttered his famous witticism: "Ask discernment from Fatimah."

The Lebanese situation had entered a state of instability in which neither war nor peace was certain. The only thing which could be reported with certainty was the spectacle of refugees under fire, or people fleeing capture, or businessmen wrestling with the problem of moving their firms and goods.

Five years after the start of the war, Lebanon is once again wrestling with the question: Is the situation approaching a new outbreak which will impel the country out of the no-war-no-peace situation in the political and military spheres, or will it continue to mark time?

The Two Wars

The fighting in the eastern part of the capital which caused matters to be decided in the Phalangist Party's favor and assured its control awakened fears of partition in the minds of many. Some politicians came close to deciding that the events witnessed in this area were just an indication of what the western area would undergo, although in a different manner because of the difference in the political and military balance of forces.

President Sarkis' acceptance of the resignation of the government, the appointment of Prime Minister Taqi al-Din al-Sulh, and the talk about a government of activists imposed the question: Will the entry of the militias and the armed organizations into the government cause it to be strengthened at their expense, or will it allow them to confiscate the legitimacy attached to the government? And thus won't this lead to the formation of a compensatory governmental structure for the side which wins out in its area of authority, thus encouraging sides in other areas to take a similar step, allowing for the differences in the balance of forces to become more widespread.

Then came the series of assassinations which culminated in the murder of press chief Riyadh Taha and Ba'ath Party national command member Musa Sha'iyb. These assassinations were both preceded and followed by a series of disruptions, some of which failed and some of which were successful. Thus, speculations of a conflict regained currency, and some whisperers were so certain that they went so far as to specify the time and place of such a conflict.

It would be a military conflict different from the rounds of fighting experienced in Lebanon in 1975. It would be reflected in assassinations, the hurling of explosives, and a political conflict brought about by the continued faltering of the process of forming a new government. Two formulas are proposed for this new government: a government of effective individuals, or a government of effective substitutes.

The responsibility for this dual conflict lies with the politicians associated with President Sarkis, who is armed with an army whose weapons have been the more effective thus far and which the various sides agree may be deployed in any area of Lebanon.

These observers feel that President Sarkis is responsible because he attempted in a secret adventure—"the first of its kind in his era"—to bypass the international law which dictates that conditions in Lebanon should be frozen in their present state until the American administration can find enough time to bring a thaw in the Middle East crisis and involve its primary sides in the settlement, thus allowing it to devote some time—however little—to the Lebanese crisis.

The more that President Sarkis—who seems alone these days—attempted to cross the red line of the international decision to freeze the situation by means of a

political government, the more isolated and under attack he became. When he brought in Taqi al-Din al-Sulh to form an active government and keep him company in his political isolation, he found that the Lebanese sides more than any others wish to hold on to their status, their roles, and their resentments, and they have worked and continue to work so that others will have these positions.

Of course, this description does not extend to all those involved in the formation of the politically active government. However, the position of some prevented the formation of a government of activists, and this had the effect of negating the positive attitude of the others in effect if not in word.

The Old Efforts

Up until last week, President Sarkis continued his efforts along with the appointed prime minister to form a political government of activists. He pursued these efforts despite difficulties which, though they seemed obvious, did not fall into the realm of impossibility in the view of those close to the president. This determination was not just a result of the fact that President Sarkis does not believe in confronting the anticipated developments in the Arab and Lebanese spheres negatively except through a government of this type. Rather, there were several other reasons, including the following:

1. President Sarkis has been working to form such a government for 3 months and with such extreme secrecy that even cabinet nominees did not want to speak openly of the government. Based on these efforts, Walid Junblat and Shaykh Amin Jumayyil reached agreement through a mutual friend that the Lebanese Army should enter the area of northern al-Matan--which is Shaykh Amin's area--several days after the formation of the government. This would simplify Mr Junblat's role in introducing the army into certain areas of al-Tannas in the western area. Shaykh Amin committed himself to this despite his knowledge that the entry of the Lebanese Army into his area confronts his brother, Shaykh Bashir, the commander of the 7 July movement, with a military map that complicates the movements of his forces.
2. President Sarkis characterizes the purge of the military forces of the Liberals which took place on 7 July under the leadership of Shaykh Bashir Jamayyil as nothing less than an attempt at partition which demands a political government to counter it, recognizing that the efforts to form such a government began prior to 7 July and became an urgent necessity following this date.
3. With regard to these efforts, Lt Col Juni 'Abduh, the director of intelligence of the Lebanese Army, was sent by President Sarkis as an envoy to Damascus on Tuesday, 4 July. He met with officials there and sought their opinion on a government comprised primarily of Walid Junblat, Samir Sabbagh, Amin Jumayyil, Dani Sham'un, Michel Sasin, and Eli Karamah. In a discussion of the prime ministership, Lieutenant Colonel 'Abduh reported on behalf of the president that this position had been narrowed down to Taqi al-Din al-Sulh and Shafiq al-Wazin. This was because former prime minister Rashid Karami had not agreed to form a government because of northern factors relating to former President Franjiyyah. His brother-in-law, Malik Salam, was in solidarity with him, according to Karami. As for Mr Shafiq al-Wazin, he also did not agree to form a government because he believed that the Islamic climate was not appropriate for cooperation with President Sarkis. He also

expressed apprehension about former prime minister Sa'ib Salam. In a meeting between him and an envoy from President Sarkis, he discussed the government of Dr Amin al-Hafiz which was rejected by both the Islamic and nationalist sides during the term of President Franjiyyah. The Syrian official laughed and said: "You like Taqi al-Din, don't you?" The Lebanese official replied that no other options were available, and he requested that President al-Asad be apprised of President Sarkis' message.

President al-Asad requested that deliberations be conducted concerning this government. The Lebanese envoy replied that the traditional parliamentary deliberations which the president had conducted were not indicative of the extent of the acceptance of such a government, and that there is no tradition of consulting the activist political and military parties on the matter of the government. He answered that the activist parties should be consulted, and so this actually occurred for the first time in the formation of a Lebanese government. The president met with the activist parliamentary, political and military leaders. The dialog took place during President Asad's reception of Mr Nabih Bara, the secretary general of the Amal movement. On 7 July, the Lebanese forces conducted an operation to eliminate the military positions of the Liberals. On the following day, President Sarkis' envoy returned to Damascus to review the situation and reiterate the make-up of the new government following the acceptance of the resignation of Dr Salim al-Huss' government. Names were added on both sides. These included Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah, former president of the Syrian National Party, as an orthodox minister, in the event that Dr Albert Mansur, representative and Nationalist Movement member, were not advanced for the Catholics.

The envoy did not seek an answer on the make-up of the government, but he said that President Sarkis saw it as an urgent national necessity, even though it appeared to be an accomplished fact to the ministers as well as to Damascus itself. The Syrian reply speculated that this government would not work, and that if President Sarkis were able to form it, then it would be in God's hands. President Franjiyyah had always been represented in the government through his son, Robert, but if it were not accepted, there was a standing offer to Mr Rene Mu'awwad to represent the north.

The envoy returned to Beirut with the Syrian reply and the make-up of the government was presented to Prime Minister Taqi al-Din al-Sulh prior to his appointment on Sunday. His response was that he wanted to have a hand in forming the government. He requested that Nasri al-Ma'luf and Fu'ad Naffa' be appointed as ministers and requested that Dr Nazih al-Bizri be ruled out.

The answer was that it was up to Prime Minister al-Sulh to convince Shaykh Pierre about Nasri al-Ma'luf, but that the rest was easily done.

Prime Minister al-Sulh was appointed on Sunday morning, and he resolved on his own part to hold parliamentary deliberations despite the fact that he had been asked to announce the government on Monday.

The Answer With Al-Amin

Things remained straightforward up to Monday afternoon, since all the envoys who had gone to Damascus up until that time had brought back ambiguous answers. However, the one exception to this was 'Abdallah al-Amin, member of the Ba'ath Party's

regional command in Lebanon, who returned demanding that Mr 'Asim Qansuh be excluded from the government. The session ended, and everyone who was inside left. On the following day, which was Tuesday, Walid Junblat went to Damascus to seek clarification of the Syrian position. This injected clear difficulty into the formation of a government of political activists.

Since that time, the search has continued outside this formula. It became clear that the appointment of Taqi al-Din al-Sulh to lead the government and the appointment of the Phalangists to the cabinet created a spate of difficulties which became hard to circumvent, despite the rapid efforts made by Mr Manh al-Sulh in Damascus.

It also appeared to be hard for President Sarkis to abandon Prime Minister Taqi al-Din, and equally hard for Damascus to bypass President Franjiyyah for a number of reasons, some of which are well known.

Now a dialog has begun concerning an ordinary mixed government drawn from members of parliament and individuals who represent--relatively speaking--the government of activists. This is a government which would supposedly set the climate for a political government.

But can this phase stand a caretaker government? The answer does not lie with President Sarkis or Prime Minister al-Sulh, but rather with the developments which are rocking the area. The manifestations of these developments in south Lebanon are clear.

8591

CSO: 4802

LEBANON

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON ARMY DAY ANALYZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 11-17 Aug 80 p 13

[Article by Rafiq Shalhala: "The Government of the '1 August' Program"]

[Text] Lebanon's celebration of Army Day this year (1 August) was not like celebrations of the past, for it included something more far-reaching than parades and symbols.

President Ilyas Sarkis found Army Day and his customary speech at the officers graduation ceremony an occasion to emphasize several facts which he has voiced numerous times in his private councils without moving into the public arena.

One of these facts was that he plans to continue exercising the responsibility of government until the end of his term. This statement was a reply to reports that have circulated in recent days in some of the information media and political clubs to the effect that the president wanted to resign. In his speech, however, he asserted that he will continue to follow the "rescue course" amid manifold difficulties which have affected every sphere of activity and in spite of the accumulation of obstacles and the series of clashes. He stated that this course is the "course of rebuilding the army, the course of rebuilding the nation, and the course of belief in our existence and in what is dearer than existence, namely, our freedom, our right and our honor."

The second fact which the president wishes to disclose was his commitment to placing security issues generally and army-related issues in particular before all other matters. In this context, the president emphasized the continued rebuilding of the army with all that it requires, "because the army is the wall of the state and the armor of the country." In this message, the president—who is the supreme commander of the army—was again responding to those who have damaged the reputation of this national institution, cast doubt on the effectiveness of rebuilding it and reequipping it, and called for a halt to this process.

The third thing which the president emphasized in his speech was his continuing effort to achieve national unification, reflecting his belief that security and unification form the cornerstone for the rebuilding of the nation. He stressed that the army took steps toward unification before the political authorities were in a position to achieve unification and bring about a meeting of the sides concerned in the Lebanese peace.

What the president failed to say in his speech in al-Fiyadhiyah he said to a delegation from the army command in the presidential palace. He added one main fact to those that he wished to disclose, namely, that the nation will not stand unless its people succeed in building a national army which is popularly supported by all Lebanese. He said that if this is not achieved, the nation's situation will be very dangerous.

Sarkis stressed the effect of a new belief in Lebanon, pointing to the responsibility of the army command in the current period and asserting that the unification of the nation and the reconciliation of the Lebanese people will make it possible for the army to assume its duties in a climate which contains much fewer difficulties and obstacles than exist at present. The entire people, added the president, call for the army in every place, but the lack of unification among the effective sides in this nation keep the ardent national desire generally unattainable. He urged that unification be accomplished while the army command is working to rebuild the institution, for when unification is accomplished, the use of the army with the aim of strengthening this unification and safeguarding it from rebellious groups will become possible.

Irrevocable Positions

Observers in Beirut felt that President Sarkis' speech to the army expressed the true position of the government on this sensitive question which preoccupies the minds of many these days. The facts that the president announced with regard to the army form the framework which the president has drawn up for present or future interaction with any Lebanese or non-Lebanese group in matters pertaining to the army. The presidential positions in this framework are irrevocable; there can be bargaining on any political matter except the military issue concerning the institution which Lebanese look toward as their means of salvation.

Observers feel that Sarkis, who has chosen to mobilize the political and security issues together, has composed a mental picture of the duties which the forthcoming government will undertake. He has apparently decided that this question will ultimately be settled after the country has edged to the very brink of the precipice.

One can also understand from this what concerned the president in his speech on the occasion of Army Day--and the message he wanted to convey was not directed solely at the members of the Lebanese army and the graduating officers, but rather at all those affected by what is occurring in Lebanon and those who are working on political and military lines at the same time. For the government has become faced with one choice for which there is no alternative, and this is to assign new duties to the army. Otherwise, it will find itself weak and the commander of the armies of the other petty states which are growing day by day and developing for themselves everything that a state needs in the fields of security, politics, information and economics. This was what President Sarkis meant when he said that the nation will be in danger unless the army assumes responsibility for maintaining its security so that it can restore its unity and bring prosperity back to its institutions.

The new government will be "the government of decision" with respect to the army, whether it is a government of activists--or individuals close to the activists--technocratic or extra-parliamentary. For the decision is not determined by the positions or characteristics of the ministers so much as it is the outcome of a consensus to safeguard the security of the country before which all other considerations yield. The people have begun to press their rulers to make the decision, and if they hesitate, the people will make another decision.

The fact is, however, that the Lebanese Army with its roughly 23,000 troops is incapable of imposing security by force at the present stage. While it is true that the Lebanese Army is the strongest of the armed groups in the Lebanese arena in terms of readiness, troop strength and leadership, it is not stronger than them collectively. The armed groups which began to work their will in the country from 1975 will not surrender their arms easily, for the owner of something cannot give it up even when threatened with force. For this reason, any new role for the army must be agreed to beforehand by the Lebanese people, because force cannot bear fruit, but will only increase the destruction and inflict more casualties. This position has always been the line which the administration has followed during the present phase. It has not deployed the army in any area without the approval of the affected sides so that the legal power returning after an absence will not be for one group and not another. It is the unionist line that the army command has formulated since the appointment of General Victor Khuri as commander which has helped make the army the hope of all those who long for security. And now, the course of rebuilding the army is continuing according to a basic program whose general features were delineated by the incontrovertible facts of unification.

In this context, one thing pointed out by President Sarkis among the facts reflected in his Army Day speech is clear. This is that national unification will simplify the role of the army and ease the burdens it will face on the ground.

The new government which will be formed sooner or later is called upon--if it is not a government of activists, and it won't be, in any case--to prepare another time for the achievement of unification. If this proves impossible, then a suitable climate in which to expand the role of the army must be prepared.

Will the new government be the "government of decision"?

Those who read between the lines of President Sarkis' speech on Army Day found that it contained a positive answer to this question. And 1 August 1980 could be the starting point.

Still, efforts must be combined, obstacles must be surmounted, reservations must disappear, interventions must come to a halt, agitation must cease to exist, and threats must evaporate so that the government--which is about to bid farewell to its fourth year in power--can make a new departure on the course of security and peace. Will the dream be achieved in the two remaining years, or will these two years be a period of weakening, so that its replacement will be weak and easily dominated?

IAEA ASSISTANCE NEEDED FOR COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 1 Oct 80 p 2

[Article: "IAEA Assistance Needed To Realize Our Nuclear Program"]

[Text] The 24th session of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) regular general conference was held recently in Vienna, the Austrian capital, with the participation of the delegates from 110 countries and numerous observers.

The Moroccan delegation to the session was headed by Ali Skali, governor with the agency's council of governors.

During this session Ali Skali made a speech in which he indicated that it is being held a short time after the meeting of the second conference which had been directed to examine the strategic arms nonproliferation treaty and whose efforts had met with failure.

The head of the Moroccan delegation added that "the international climate is experiencing a serious deterioration and many tense hotspots have appeared which may generate grave consequences for the peace and security of the world."

After drawing attention to the dwindling of natural sources of energy, Ali Skali indicated that the use of nuclear energy is becoming unavoidable in insuring economic and social development, and therefore the well-being of all humanity. "For this reason my delegation has not ceased to underline the importance of the mission of the agency, and its great responsibility in the field of utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," the head of the Moroccan delegation noted.

Ali Skali then drew the attention of the participants to the work of the 24th IAEA session to the fact that the Moroccan delegation considers that in order to achieve concrete results in the field of nonproliferation of nuclear arms, it is absolutely necessary for the nuclear powers to respect the NTP [Nonproliferation Treaty] and fully implement the obligations stemming from it. "Now," says the head of the Moroccan delegation, "nuclear tests are constantly increasing."

Continuing his speech, Ali Skali recalled the need for the nuclear powers to offer security guarantees to the countries not equipped with nuclear arms. "My delegation welcomes the creation of a special work group of the disarmament committee for international agreements, able to effectively insure the states not

equipped with nuclear arms against the use or threat of usage of nuclear arms" added Skali, who remarked that the creation of denuclearized zones constitutes an important disarmament measure."

Moroccan Energy Resources

Mentioning the energy resources at Morocco's disposal, the head of the Moroccan delegation pointed out that "the primary energy sources used to meet our needs are water resources, coal and hydrocarbons."

"The results registered in the 1978-1979 period demonstrate that the average rate of annual growth for primary energy was 7.5 percent.

Our primary energy consumption needs were filled in 1979 in the following percentages: 82.1-hydrocarbons, 8.8-hydroelectricity, 7.8-coal, and 1.3-local natural gas.

Underlining the importance attached to the search for oil in our country, Ali Skali said:

"Many operations are being carried out in that connection, either with the state's own resources or in association with foreign partners. At the present time many promising sedimentary basins are the object of intense prospecting on land and at sea, as Morocco has at its disposal 2 maritime fronts which extend over almost 3,500 km.

"Moreover, one of the most promising approaches in Morocco is represented by the development of oil shale resources whose thick strata form the substructure of the layers of phosphates. Therefore, this confirms the fact that our country which has three-fourths of the world's phosphate reserves, is also well provided with oil shale. Two important beds (Timahdit and Tarfaya) have already been the object of significant geological, mining and technological operations. Programmed studies, work and realizations aim at developing this natural resource, for the production of electricity by direct burning as well as for the production of oil and gas through pyrolysis."

As regards hydroelectricity, the head of the Moroccan delegation indicated that it represents at the present time about 9 percent of the national energy consumption and could be developed further, considering the number of favorable sites in the waterways system which present an energy potential of 6 billion KWH, of which 2 billion are now being used. It is planned to equip the entire remaining potential by the year 2000 not only as regards large projects, but also for small water resources.

"As for coal, which represents 7.4 percent in the energy balance of our country, it is produced in Jerada at the rate of 750,000 tons per year. Fitting out a new center is continuing in order to increase this production. At the present time research is being carried out with the view of determining the extent of the bed under the Hauts Plateau.

"As regards uranium, during the last few years, geological and radiometric explorations have been carried out by seismological survey, drilling and mining operations, principally in the high Moulaya where 22 borings were made and in the High Western Atlas where 54 borings were made, yielding high uranium content with possibly as much as 1.13 uranium oxide."

As regards the uranium contained in the phosphates, we are following very closely the development of technology for its extraction, starting with phosphoric acid and we are especially following the results obtained in some industrial units already being exploited.

In connection with nuclear energy, Ali Skali indicated that the "first 600 MW nuclear unit will probably not be operational before 1993-1994, and it would be interesting--for reasons of ease of use and furnishing of spare parts--to construct some identical units before going on to a higher energy stage.

"Studies in the choice of sites and training of highly technical cadres which have already been accomplished in collaboration with IAEA experts, will be intensified during the course of the next few years.

"The nuclear program outlined beyond 1993 therefore includes the staggered establishment, up to the year 2000, of four 600 MW units."

Skali announced that "Morocco, which has proceeded with the purchase of a research reactor of the Triga type from General Atomic has already received the reactor vessel and plans to complete its installation in a few months," and he added "that the development of the scientific and technical program expected from its operation cannot succeed without the continuing assistance of IAEA experts." And Skali concluded "in these different fields the agency's assistance is at the same time necessary and valuable. Consequently, we would like to express the hope that the agency's assistance program will be continued and developed."

7993

CSO: 4400

REPORT ON SHALE OIL OUTLOOK

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 17 Oct 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] At the conclusion of the Moroccan-American symposium on oil shale, Mr Moussa Saadi provided information on the development of these deposits, which, in ten years, in 1990, will furnish the equivalent of 3,100,000 barrels of oil annually. To be sure, this amount is not a limit: production could be increased as much as will be feasible.

Here are the plans to be carried out:

1. Immediate realization of the extraction facility T3 (national process) which will be operational in 1983 at a cost of 1300 million dirhams.

Beginning in 1985, it will produce 100,000 barrels of oil annually.

2. Realization of the continuous surface process to be placed in service in 1988, which will, in 1990, have an annual production of 1,750,000 barrels.

3. Establishment of the first on-site treatment facility which will go into service in 1988 and which will produce, in 1990, 250,000 barrels of oil annually.

This on-site process must be further tested, but if positive results are achieved, it is possible that the capacity of this facility will be increased.

4. Immediate realization of the thermal power plant at Timahdit. A contract has been signed with the USSR to put the first section, from 200 to 250 megawatts, into service in 1984. When the four or five sections will be operational, the plant will produce 3 billion KWH annually, the equivalent of a million tons of oil.

These are very reasonable goals, with regard to the immense possibilities offered by the Moroccan oil shales.

However, we must take these various factors into account:

1. The high rate of investments which have kept the project (in the least) costly (preliminary) stage (of all) the T3 process.

2. The rapid development of extraction techniques which is an incentive for Morocco to avoid any excessive haste.

3. The high cost of oil produced and the favorable prospects offered by oil research.

Following are the essential aspects of the outstanding talk Mr Moussa Saadi gave before the symposium on Moroccan oil shale. Here are the main points of the talk that Mr Moussa Saadi gave on oil shale in Rabat during the Moroccan-American symposium:

"The deposits of oil shale known today, which include considerable oil resources, are primarily located in the United States, the USSR, Brazil, China, Australia, and of course, in Morocco. Other reserves are now being evaluated in several countries, including Jordan and Thailand.

The technologies for development of these bituminous rocks are improving daily and should allow oil shales to play an increasingly important role, especially in countries such as Morocco, where consumption, still relatively modest, can be satisfied, at least in part, by this resource.

"Moreover, interest in oil shales is not a recent phenomenon. The first patent to extract oil from shale was granted to a group of English entrepreneurs in 1964 [sic]. Following this, other processes have been put into use, especially in France, Scotland, Sweden, Brazil and China. However, even though the production of oil from bituminous shale preceded the discovery of oil, it has remained very weak in comparison with the production of the oil industry, since the advent of this latter in 1959 and above all, after the discovery of large deposits in the Middle East.

"It is above all after World War II and in a world context, where the economy was based on abundant and cheap energy, that the oil shale industry yielded to the unprecedented growth of oil, by vanishing in the majority of countries, with the exception of the USSR, where development continues even today.

The Timahdit deposit

"With regards to Morocco, the first attempt at development was begun, near Tangiers, in 1943. This however, was discontinued. It was in 1964 that interest in the oil shales of Timahdit was renewed. Morocco's participation in the international symposium on oil shales, organized in 1968 in Tallin, in Estonia (USSR), provided it with information on various uses of oil shales, such as the production of oil and gas, direct combustion for the production of electricity and the development of by-products such as ash.

"This prompted a preliminary geological study of the Timahdit deposit with the collaboration of Soviet experts. At the time of the energy crisis at the end of 1973, Morocco already had available a good geological study on this large deposit.

The discovery of Tarfaya

"In March 1974, His Majesty the King, in his historical speech in Erfoud, attracted attention to the necessity of promoting research on mining and on energy-producing substances, while developing to the maximum the resources of the national subsoil. Beginning with these directives and profiting from the geological information furnished by various geologists who had worked in Morocco, exploration was undertaken in several regions, which led to the discovery of another large deposit of oil shale in the region of Tarfaya.

Under the phosphates

Numerous outcrops of bituminous rocks were discovered throughout the country. The majority of them were in the same geological strata situated in the upper cretaceous layers. From this, it can be observed that the layers of oil shales of this age formed the bedrock for layers of phosphates. It is not therefore surprising that Morocco, which possesses three-quarters of the world's phosphate reserves, also has considerable oil shale reserves. These same layers are found in other countries of Africa, the Near East and America, sometimes along with liquid hydrocarbons.

The characteristics of Moroccan oil shale

"Soil and laboratory studies, conducted in connection with numerous foreign organizations, have shown that the characteristics of Moroccan shales, especially those of Timahdit, are favorable in comparison with other deposits throughout the world.

--"Great thicknesses of layers containing kerosene of sometimes more than 100 to 150 meters.

--"Regularity of grades along the same level and progressive development of these grades in depth with a maximum in the middle of the formation.

--"Inexistence of completely sterile layers within this formation.

--"Good quality of extracted oil which is considered excellent by the experts.

--"Sulfur content amounting to eight percent of the oil are sufficiently high to permit profitable recovery of this product, so valuable to the phosphate industry.

--"The mechanical properties of the bituminous rocks show enough compaction to allow underground and open-pit mining to begin, without however, showing extreme resistance to fracturing and crushing.

As with phosphates, the main deposits of oil shale are never too far from the sea. The Tarfaya deposit is even situated on the shores of the Atlantic, which represents a great advantage for the water supply of future industrial facilities.

As demonstrated in Timahdit, these shales are self-combustible, which makes them particularly useful for the production of electricity.

The deposits are often situated in thinly populated regions and do not pose many environmental problems.

Moreover, the Timahdit deposit has the advantage of being located in the center of the country, not far from the main areas of consumption.

All these advantages combine to give Moroccan oil shale excellent conditions for development.

Conclusive tests

"For this reason, this deposit was the subject of exhaustive geological and mining work, which allowed the clarification of the reserves and the various procedures

actually known, both in America and in Europe. It was in this way that almost all of the most well-known treatment procedures were tested. Tests of direct combustion were also performed, as were studies of on-site procedures.

"All these studies and tests yielded positive results. The ashes produced from pyrolysis and combustion were also the subject of a laboratory study which showed that it is possible to use them in making cement and construction materials.

"These were the principal results recorded and trends pursued. As you can observe, all the results obtained were positive. With the successive oil price rises on the international market, the exploitation of shales is showing itself to be increasingly competitive compared to the price of foreign oil. What is more, such a project will permit the country to gradually ensure its energy independence and to free itself from the unknown factors characteristic of the oil market, while enjoying other economic and social advantages.

9671

CSO: 4400

TRADE BALANCE FOR FIRST HALF OF 1980

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 3 Oct 80 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Trade Balance for First Half of 1980: Imports: 8,569.9 M DH (+24.5 percent) Exports: 5,027.5 M DH (+39.7 percent)"]

[Text] According to the statistical tables of the foreign exchange office, the trade balance for the first half of 1980 appears as follows:

Imports:	8569.9 MDH
Exports:	5027.5 MDH
Deficit:	3542.4 MDH

As compared with last year these figures show significant increases:

Imports:	+24.5 percent
Exports:	+39.7 percent

We recently published the trade balance figures for the first 5 months of 1980. Remarkable results were noted as regards exports which showed an increase of 59.7 percent. A set back was evinced in June. As a matter of fact exports progressed only slightly (+5.1 percent).

The following are the overall results for the month of June (in MDH):

	1979	1980
Imports	1220.3	1252.6
Exports	626.5	658.2
Deficits	593.8	594.4

It should be noted that the import-export coverage which amounted to 52.3 percent for the first half of 1979 rose to 58.7 percent in 1980. At the end of May it was 59.7 percent. It was influenced by the June results where the coverage was only 52.54 percent.

We recently published the broad lines of the overall Moroccan trade balance for the first half of 1980. Hereunder you will find new particulars on the results arrived at by entering in the books CAF [expansion unknown] imports, and FOB exports for each of the first 6 months.

The increase in exports is explained essentially, on the one hand, by important shipments of raw material and on the other by semi-manufactured products.

JANUARY	CAF IMPORTS	FOB EXPORTS	BALANCE
1979	1043.6	579.3	-464.3
1980	1257.8	657.3	-600.5
FEBRUARY			
1979	1014.7	487.6	-527.1
1980	1463.8	840.4	-623.4
MARCH			
1979	1162.1	638.4	-523.7
1980	1457.6	990.1	-467.5
APRIL			
1979	1268	624.1	-643.9
1980	1751.4	911.7	-839.7
MAY			
1979	1176.6	642.5	-534.1
1980	1386.8	969.8	-417
JUNE			
1979	1220.3	626.5	-593.8
1980	1252.6	658.2	-594.4
TOTAL			
1979	6885.3	3598.4	-3286.9
1980	8569.9	5027.5	-3542.4

In fact, the sale of phosphates accrued in value up to 40.1 percent reaching 262.2 MDH as against 187.2 MDH. It must be remembered that this concerns finance statistics which do not account for exported tonnage but for foreign exchange collections. These statistics are lower than the actual figures since they go back to the end of 1979. Since then exported tonnage has increased and phosphate's market price has resurged in a most spectacular manner.

As regards shipments of phosphoric acid our receipts have grown and have reached 41.1 MDH, as against only 14.7 MDH. The same trend also applies to our citrus fruit exportation: 33.6 MDH as against 0.6 MDH and for canned fish: 45.1 MDH as against 16.3 MDH.

On the other hand, the sale of mining products, other than phosphates, registers a decrease (45.6 MDH against 95.6 MDH) due to the falling off of our lead exports: 6 MDH against 56.1 MDH.

As regards the growth in our imports (1,252.6 MDH against 1220.3 MDH) this is due especially to the advance in the prices of energy products and the increase in our sulphur purchases.

7993

CSO: 4400

MOROCCO TO CREATE POSTS FOR COMMERCIAL ATTACHES

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 15 Oct 80 pp 1-2

[Text] The Council of Government, which met last Thursday 9 September, under the chairmanship of Mr Maati Bouabid, prime minister and minister of justice, adopted an important measure creating an overseas commercial attache position.

It must be kept in mind that the appointment of overseas commercial attaches is part of measures taken to stimulate exports, as provided for in the economic and social development programs of 1973-1977 and 1978-1980.

These measures also concern the creation of the CMPE (Moroccan Center for Export Promotion), the establishment of export guarantees and provisions for export financing, to name a few. The establishment of these export incentives is a necessity which must be tied to the need to reduce the deficit in our commercial exchanges by means of stronger export promotions and a reinforcement of the country's economic and financial independence.

Besides its positive effect on the balance of trade, export development is an essential stimulus of economic growth through its effects on employment, industrialization and the development of national resources.

Because of this, His Majesty's government has always considered the export sector a fundamental priority of its program of action.

The various measures which have been taken on behalf of this sector, such as the publication of an export code, the establishment of an economic customs system and export guarantees, show the desire of the government to significantly promote exports. These export incentives would have a limited effect if there were no steady assurances of outlets for our products, especially our manufactured goods, in the principal markets.

Moreover, the experience of several countries who are leaders in exports has shown that the presence in the market of a team made up of commercial promoters or "vendors" is an irreplaceable means to:

- explore commercial opportunities and gain knowledge of the market in question,

- orient national exporters on identified gaps and provide them with all requested assistance to fill them,

--act as an advisor for the choice of products, distribution network, advertising strategies, etc.

With the creation of this overseas commercial attache post, an important gap has now been filled.

The advisors attached to the ministry in charge of foreign commerce will be assigned to Moroccan diplomatic missions and placed under the authority of the diplomatic mission head. These economic advisors are responsible for many different tasks.

They will be in charge of:

--apprising and informing the various administrations and companies on everything that bears on exchange between their assigned country and Morocco,

--participating in the preparation and negotiation of commercial agreements that Morocco must conclude with third countries,

--coordinating Morocco's economic and commercial action in the countries concerned,

--assisting farmers, merchants and national manufacturers in their foreign economic activities, etc.

The importance of the functions that will be assigned to these economic advisors justifies the rigorous conditions for selection provided by the decree just adopted.

An original aspect of this decree is that it opens access to these functions to people with experience in the private sector. This praiseworthy initiative shows that the greatest priority is placed on the experience of the candidates and their competence in the area of international commerce.

A training period of several months has also been provided to familiarize the future economic advisors with the techniques of international marketing and facts about the countries in which they will exercise their functions.

With this new measure, Morocco will be equipped with structures well-adapted to this main priority of export promotion. Moreover, this action will round out the activities of the Moroccan Center for Export Promotion.

This center, which will be set up in Casablanca, will be primarily oriented towards export promotion of manufactured goods.

9671

CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

NEW SUGAR REFINERY--In conjunction with the government policy of His Majesty the King of providing for the country's sugar needs as rapidly as possible, a ceremony was held last Wednesday afternoon at the headquarters of the ministry of finance, during which Mr Abdelkamel Reghay, minister of finance, Mr Azzeddine Guessous, minister of commerce, industry, the merchant marine and maritime fishing and His Highness Moulay Ali, in his capacity of president of the sugar company of Znamra, signed an investment agreement for the establishment of a new sugar refinery at Khemis Znamra, in the province of El Jadida. The production of the new sugar refinery will provide for 8 to 10 percent of Morocco's present consumption. It will employ 500 salaried workers, of which about 180 will be permanent positions. It should be noted that several Moroccan sugar refineries will provide the authorized capital for this new company, including COSUMAR (Moroccan Sugar Company) and the sugar refineries of Doukkala and Sidi Bennour. A Moroccan-Kuwaiti investment group will also participate. [Text] [Rabat L'OPINION in French 17 Oct 80 p 2] 9671

CSO: 4400

OFFICIAL IS OPTIMISTIC OF RICH OIL RESERVES

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 5 Nov 80 p 11

[Text]

New, commercially viable oilfields in southern Oman mean that the country is heading for self sufficiency, as it also has vast untapped reserves of natural gas. The problem is manpower.

THE OIL picture is fairly bright right now. We don't want to be too optimistic, with inflation coming this way, but ... There is a definite note of excitement in his voice as the usually cautious spokesman of Petroleum Development (Oman), a company closely associated with Shell, discusses the new fields in southern Oman.

At the moment Oman is pumping just under 300,000 barrels per day. This does not put the country in the big league, but it does belie the view put forward five years ago by some pessimists that Oman's resources would shortly be close to depletion.

NOT FEASIBLE

The new 445-kilometre pipeline which brings oil from the southern fields and links up with the pipe from Fadhul is in full use. Its construction is regarded as a technical feat because of Oman's geography.

To connect Birba and Mar-mul with the oil terminal at Mina al Fahaj near Muscat, it was necessary to lay the pipeline over mountainous ranges.

The existence of oil in southern Oman has been known for thirty years, since Wendell Phillips received an exclusive oil concession from Sultan Said bin Taimur, the

former ruler and the father of Sultan Qaboos.

But the fields were never exploited, partly because of the old sultan's refusal to allow economic development in his country. Also, the fields were not considered economically feasible at the time because they only yielded heavy crude. Recent discoveries of light crude have overcome this objection.

OBSTACLE

The Oman government is now anxious to produce as much oil as possible. A refinery is being built near Muscat with the collaboration of the Japanese giant Mitsubishi. When it comes on stream in 1982 it will have a refining capacity of 50,000 b/d. Oman's own consumption currently stands at 25,000 b/d, so the country is heading for self sufficiency.

Oman also has considerable reserves of natural gas which it has barely touched. By the 1990s it is expected that many rural power stations which now operate on refined oil will have converted to gas.

Oman's development of resources does face a serious obstacle — a lack of technical expertise and manpower. It has virtually no petroleum engineers and few junior technicians.

Sultan bin Taimur's aversion to development extended to education, and ten years ago, when he was deposed, the country still had no school system.

RURAL BIAS IN NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN REPORTED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 22 Nov 80 pp 18-19

[Text] The Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Qais Al Zarawi, who is also Vice President of the Financial Affairs Council last Sunday outlined the main features of Oman's new Five-Year Development Plan beginning in January 1981.

The plan was approved by Sultan Qaboos last Saturday. The Minister told reporters that the plan took two years of concerted efforts by the Ministries for its preparation.

The plan he said estimated the net revenue of the state during the next five years to be around 6,947 million Omani Rials after deducting the stipulated amount of the general reserve fund of the state.

The general expenditure for the next five years would be OR 7,364 million including OR 2,152 million for developmental purposes. The developmental outlay would thus be more than double that in the first plan period.

The Minister said the plan includes an extensive programme to provide facilities to various parts of the Sultanate with priority to areas like the Musandam area, the southern region; the interior region and other remote areas.

The facilities, he explained, would include schools, health clinics, roads electricity, water and cultural, religious and social centers. The aim was to bring these areas to the level of other developed parts of the country.

The minister said the plan gave special priority to irrigation, agriculture and fisheries. It also gave a boost to the private sector in agriculture, fisheries, industry, mining and traditional professions.

The plan also provided for an outlay of one million rials for construction of low cost houses. The outlays on roads, ports telecommunications, health and education, were much more than in the first plan.

The Minister said that a bank will be set up to promote agriculture and fisheries projects in the private sector. The development bank already existing would offer loans for industrial, mining and other development projects.

A manual giving details of the plan would be published soon, he said.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

JOINT YSP-DFLP COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED

Aden AL-THAWRI in Arabic 25 Oct 80 pp 5, 13

[Article: "Joint Communique on Outcome of Talks Between Yemeni Socialist Party and Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine"]

[Text] At the invitation of the YSP [Yemeni Socialist Party] Central Committee, a delegation of the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] led by Nayif Hawatimah, the secretary general, visited the PDRY from 3-9 October 1980. The delegation included comrade Taysir Khalid, DFLP Political Bureau member, and comrade Abu-Firas, the DFLP representative in Aden.

During its visit, the delegation met with comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the YSP Central Committee secretary general, chairman of the presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly and the prime minister, and with numerous party and state leaders. The Yemeni and Palestinian sides reviewed the Yemeni and Palestinian conditions and the serious political developments in the Arab area and the Middle East in particular and the international situation generally.

The talks between the YSP and the DFLP were characterized by comradely frankness and reflected the struggle relations between the two sides. During its visit, the delegation familiarized itself with the development of the revolutionary experience in the Democratic Yemen and with the extensive preparations for the special YSP general congress. The delegation asserted that this congress, which will be held this October, constitutes a prominent event in the country's political life--an event that is liable to bolster the party's leadership role among the toilers and popular masses of the Democratic Yemen, to enhance the progressive regimes's status, to safeguard, develop and defend its accomplishments, to improve the various branches of the national economy and to enhance the people's standard of living in the economic, social, educational and cultural spheres. The Yemeni and Palestinian sides also underlined the fundamental role of the special congress in bolstering the struggle to realize Yemeni unity on national and progressive bases and with the free democratic will of the people in both parts of Yemen. They also underlined the role of this congress in bolstering the relations of struggle alliance between the Democratic Yemen on the one side and the Arab liberation and progress forces and the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front on the other, as well as the relations of struggle alliance with the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, so as to march forward in a united front against imperialism, Zionism, racism and reaction and to build the world of peace, social progress and socialism.

The DFLP delegation has expressed its deep appreciation for the accomplishments realized by the Democratic Yemen under the YSP leadership in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres throughout the years of independence. The delegation has also expressed its appreciation for the success achieved by the PDRY in the sphere of foreign policy at both the Arab and international levels by bolstering its relations with the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and with the Socialist countries, especially in the wake of concluding the friendship treaties with the Soviet Union, the GDR and Ethiopia and in view of the role that these treaties play in realizing the interests of the liberation and progress forces in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, particularly under the shadow of the renewed U.S. strategy of aggression in this area. The DFLP has also expressed its high appreciation for the YDP policy and for the Yemeni people's struggle to unite the two parts of Yemen on democratic bases opposed to imperialism and reaction.

The Palestinian delegation, led by DFLP Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah, also reviewed with the YSP leaders the latest developments in the Arab area and the connection of these developments with the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples' struggle to foil the U.S. imperialist settlement, to confine it to the Egyptian-Israeli front and to obstruct its spreading to the Palestinian front and the other Arab fronts. They also reviewed the efforts of the Arab confrontation and steadfastness forces to continue the struggle against the West European and reactionary Arab schemes complementing the Camp David accords and to foil and defeat these plans in preparation for repelling the Israeli occupation from all the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories and for realizing the Palestinian people's right to repatriation, self-determination and an independent national state. The delegation also reviewed the struggle and steadfastness of the Palestinian masses, their valiant opposition to self-rule, and the expanding role performed by the DFLP within the framework of the PLO to bolster the Palestinian national unity inside and outside the occupied territories and under the canopy of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The YSP leadership, led by comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, has expressed the principled and firm position of the Democratic Yemen vis-a-vis the Palestinian people's struggle for their right to repatriation, self-determination and an independent national state without any shackles or conditions. This leadership has also expressed its condemnation of the Camp David agreement and its firm position against the West European and reactionary Arab schemes complementing this agreement and this U.S. imperialist settlement. The leadership has also expressed its readiness to continue its support for the Palestinian revolution's and Lebanese National Movement's struggle against the imperialist, Israeli, Lebanese and isolationist plots aimed at the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples' resistance and at arranging the conditions on the Lebanese arena and in the occupied territories. In particular, to accept these schemes that complement the U.S. imperialist settlement for the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The YSP leadership has also expressed its deep appreciation for the fundamental, outstanding and escalating role undertaken by the DFLP to build the Palestinian National Front in the occupied territories and to strengthen the national unity within the framework of the PLO and for the role performed by the DFLP in defining and popularizing the Palestinian people's national and pan-Arab struggle tasks within the framework of the Arab national liberation movement.

The two sides have also expressed the unified position that the struggle to foil the U.S. imperialist settlement and the schemes complementing it that are being prepared by Western Europe and the International Socialism, in coordination with the Arab reactionaries in the area and in agreement with the United States, forms the central link in the entire struggle of the Arab national liberation movement which is opposed to imperialism, Zionism, and reaction. They have also expressed the unified position that this struggle requires that strong assistance be advanced to the Palestinian resistance and to the Lebanese National Movement on the advance confrontation lines so as to foil the schemes seeking to weaken and contain the revolution forces and to subjugate the PLO and to turn it into a disarmed political front. They require support for resistance to the schemes also seeking to weaken and contain the Lebanese revolutionary and National Movement forces and to impose the U.S.-Israeli-isolationist Lebanese solution on the Lebanese arena at the expense of Lebanon's unity, Arabism and independent democratic development. The two sides have also lauded the steadfastness and sacrifices of the fraternal Lebanese people and of their national and progressive forces and their honorable positions in defending the revolution and the PLO. The two sides have also underlined their united position in support of Lebanon's unity, Arabism and independent democratic development.

The two sides have also lauded the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and condemned the Israeli enemy's decision to annex Jerusalem as a flagrant challenge against the Palestinian people's right to their homeland and a flagrant challenge in the face of the Arab and Muslim peoples in particular and of the world community generally. They have also urged the Arab states to adopt tangible and effective measures against the Israeli enemy and against the U.S. imperialism by putting their capabilities on the advance fronts to support the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese National Movement and Syria. The two sides have also urged the Arab states to cut off oil and gas supplies to the United States, to withdraw Arab assets from the U.S. banks and to boycott the U.S. economically because of the U.S. position that supports the Israeli enemy and that defies openly the will of the Palestinian people, the Arab and Muslim peoples and of the international community.

The two sides have also reviewed the Arab situation and have underlined the importance of the Syrian-Libyan unity and its role in bolstering Syria's steadfastness in the face of the Israeli enemy, and of the imperialist and reactionary acts of sabotage and plotting that support the Syrian reactionaries and the Muslim Brotherhood gangs at home with the aim of weakening Syria's opposition to Camp David and to the schemes complementing it and with the aim of employing the conditions on the Syrian front to prepare for Syria's subscription to the U.S. imperialist settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The two sides have also underlined this unity's role in bolstering the Libyan Jamahiriyyah's steadfastness in the face of al-Sadat's reactionary concentrations on the Jamahiriyyah's borders and in the face of the U.S.-al-Sadat-Israeli alliance and the U.S. military bases in Egypt that pose a threat to the security and peace of the Libyan Jamahiriyyah and of the Arab area. The two sides have also lauded the formation of the Egyptian National Front under the leadership of Lt Gen Sa'd al Din al-Shadhili and the struggle of the Egyptian masses at home under the leadership of their national progressive forces, led by the Progressive National Grouping. They have also underlined their firm solidarity with the Egyptian people's struggle to overthrow the regime of the traitor al-Sadat

who is sacrificing the Egyptian people's supreme interests and is plotting with the U.S. imperialism and with Zionism against the liberation and progress forces in the Arab area and in Africa.

The two sides have reviewed the conditions in the Arab Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea area and the Horn of Africa and have underlined the importance of establishing the relations among the states of this vital area on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence as a main condition for sparing the area's peoples the dangers emanating from the strong tension nurtured by the imperialism of the United States of America--tension that escalates the chances of threatening the peoples' security and stability. In this regard, the two sides have underlined their full condemnation of the United States and of its policy which is based on building military bases of aggression in Egypt, Oman, Somalia and Kenya in preparation for concluding suspect military security alliances tied to the Pentagon circles and to the renewed U.S. strategy of aggression which is masked by the slogans of defending the Arab and Islamic countries against imaginary dangers and which actually seeks to plot and commit aggression against the Democratic Yemen, the socialist Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Middle East national liberation movement and against all the forces of progress and liberation that are opposed to imperialism, Zionism and reaction in the Arab area and in the Middle East. The two sides have urged the area's peoples and their national and progressive forces to struggle jointly for the liquidation of these aggressive U.S. bases, for defeating the imperialism of the United States and for liquidating its oil and economic interests. The two sides have also stressed their full condemnation of the course of hostility to communism and to the Soviet Union--a course masked falsely with Islam and seeking fundamentally to cover up the ambitions of the U.S. imperialism and its policy which is against the security and stability of the Arab area and of the Middle East and the National interests of their peoples--a policy seeking fundamentally to weaken the national and pan-Arab liberation struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The two sides have stressed that the struggle against the renewed U.S. strategy of aggression in the Arab area in particular and in the Red Sea, Horn of Africa and the Middle East generally requires unity of struggle by the forces of the Arab national liberation movement and requires the alliance of these forces with the Iranian, Afghan and Ethiopian revolution in a broad regional front and with the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, for joint struggle to confront and defeat the U.S.-Israeli-Arab reactionary onslaught and to liquidate the U.S. military bases that pose a threat to the security and peace of the peoples.

The two sides have expressed their support for the struggle of the fraternal Omani people under the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman to liquidate the U.S. bases and foreign forces and to evict them for good from Omani territories and their struggle to build an independent, free and democratic Oman.

The two sides have also expressed their support for the struggle of the Sahara people and for their right to determine their future under the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of (al-Saqiyah al-Hamra' and Wadi al-Dhahab) and have lauded the military victories scored by the Sahara people and the expanding international recognition of the Sahara Republic.

The two sides have reaffirmed their solidarity with the Ethiopian revolution and have expressed appreciation for the revolutionary Ethiopian leadership's efforts to preserve Ethiopia's unity and to improve Ethiopia's economic and social conditions. They have also expressed support for the big basic steps taken by the revolution leadership to build the Working People's Party, the vanguard of the workers, farmers and other Ethiopian toilers.

The two sides have reviewed with extreme interest the ongoing war between Iraq and Iran, the big service that this war renders the U.S. imperialism and the Israeli enemy and the grave harm it causes the joint struggle of the Arab and Iranian peoples in the interest of the common enemy, especially of the U.S.-Israeli-al-Sadat Camp David alliance.

The two sides have also reviewed the international conditions and expressed their satisfaction with the victories scored by the peoples of Indochina, southwest Asia, Africa and Nicaragua and the alignment of the peoples of these countries with the camp of the liberation, progress and socialism forces whose strength is growing steadily as a result of the struggle of these peoples—a struggle that relies on the support and backing of the Soviet Union and of the socialist countries.

The two sides underline their support for the efforts of the Soviet Union and of the socialist countries to back up the anti-imperialist front and their efforts to strengthen detente and peaceful coexistence, in order to preserve the gains of peoples and to safeguard world peace and security. While supporting the SALT II agreement and denouncing the U.S. administration's maneuvers to block its approval and while supporting the sincere efforts to bring success to the European security conference scheduled to be held in Madrid at the end of this year, the two sides condemn the policy of the U.S. imperialism to set up and develop new medium-range nuclear missile bases in West Europe by virtue of its escalating the arms race and of threatening the safety and security of the European and world peoples.

In reviewing the development of the bilateral struggle relations between them, the two sides have expressed full satisfaction with the broad and deep cooperation between the YSP and DFLP in the various spheres. To strengthen this cooperation, a bilateral cooperation agreement has been concluded by the two sides.

At the conclusion of the visit, comrade Nayif Hawatimah and the delegation accompanying him expressed their deep appreciation for the warm welcome accorded them and for the outcome of the talks with the YSP leadership.

8494

CSO: 4802

GULF STATES, TURKEY SIGN OIL ACCORD

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 10 Nov 80 p 2

[Text] BAHRAIN, Sun. — Gulf countries agreed in principle today to help Turkey make up a shortfall in oil supplies from warring Iran and Iraq, a Turkish Embassy spokesman in Saudi Arabia said.

The agreement was reached at talks in Riyadh among Turkish Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Ibn Abdulaziz and the Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal.

Turkey depends on Iran and Iraq for nine million tonnes a year (180,000 barrels a day) of oil.

IN PRINCIPLE

Saudi Arabia also agreed in principle to sign a long-term oil supply contract with Turkey, the spokesman added. He said no timetable prices or amounts had been decided for either the short-term aid or long-term contract.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey agreed during the talks that they have similar views about regional problems and King Khalid would visit Turkey at a date to be fixed, the spokesman said. — Reuter.

CSO: 4820

FIRST CONTRACTS AWARDED FOR PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAI REPORT & MIDE in English 10 Nov 80 pp 13, 14

[Text]

Gulf Petrochemical Industries has awarded the first contracts for the construction of its \$400 million ammonia and methanol complex in Bahrain.

King Wilkinson (International) of Houston, which prepared the initial feasibility study for the project and which is working on a similar plant in Saudi Arabia, has been awarded a consultancy contract worth up to \$9 million, it was announced last week.

Uhde of West Germany has won an order for an undisclosed sum for process technology and for technical expertise; the methanol process itself is sub-licensed from ICI of Britain.

The complex is designed to produce 1,000 tonnes of methanol and 1,000 tonnes of ammonia daily. Gulf Petrochemical's Chairman, Tewfik al-Moayed, said last week that the company expected to put out for tender early next year for the main contract. He explained that the agreement with Uhde was for the preparation of basic engineering for the entire petrochemical complex.

Wimpey Laboratories has won a site survey and soil analysis contract prior to the clearing of the 1,000 metre by 600 metre site, which is being reclaimed from the sea. Cowiconsult of Denmark has been appointed civil consultants for the site project.

Gulf Petrochemical, which is capitalised at \$160 million, is owned as a joint venture by the governments of Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

NEW REFINERY--Oil officials are studying bids by international oil companies to build a new 50,000 barrels a day adjacent to the national oil distributing company refinery at Umm Said. The refinery, 3 times bigger than the existing unit is expected to meet the increasing local demand for refined oil up to 1995. In the initial years its surplus products will be exported. The existing 10,000 barrels a day refinery currently produces 885,231 barrels regular grade petrol, 36,000 barrels of high octane petrol, 32,000 barrels of kerosene, 482,000 barrels of jet fuel and 965,000 barrels of diesel oil. But Qatar's consumption exceeds 878,000 barrels of regular grade petrol, 362,000 barrels of high octane petrol, 34,000 barrels of kerosene, 549,000 barrels of jet fuel and 1,350,000 barrels of diesel oil. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 8 Nov 80 p 9]

NEW BANKING MEASURES--The Qatar Monetary Agency is considering the introduction of a legal reserve requirement on local and foreign currency deposits for local banks. It is likely that the percentage would be along "Gulf lines" and no interest would be paid on the reserves. Local currency deposits would be tackled first, to be followed later by foreign currency deposits held by local banks. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 8 Nov 80 p 13]

CSO: 4820

SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION WITH FRANCE NOTED

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 13 Nov 80 p 13

[Article by Ahmad Shaaban]

(Text) RIYADH — Plans for a solar energy powered thermodynamic plant on a site near Riyadh two years ago mushroomed into a full-fledged cooperation programme.

Between the Kingdom and France. Now the plant — scheduled to begin operating soon — will also serve as a magnet for research especially in the uses of solar energy for agriculture, according to Didier Ganichot, an adviser to the French ambassador in Jeddah.

Elements to "experiment and test the different services which solar energy could render to an agricultural installation at a remote site" will make up part of the cooperative programme, Ganichot said. Included will be operations on pumping, air-conditioning, refrigeration, winter-gardens, and water desalination.

RESEARCH

The original 40-kilowatt plant near Riyadh, requested two years ago by the Saudi national company Electrico, was supplied by Sofretec, a semi-governmental firm which specialises in advanced technology, Ganichot said.

The Saudi Arabian National Centre for Science and Technology (SANCST) received the plant. That body is responsible for all solar energy research programmes in the kingdom.

When the agreement with Sofretec came through, one giant step followed — the cooperative venture. A protocol between SANCST and the French Commissariat de l'Energie Atomique (CEA) was signed, and two Saudi Arabian engineers designated for the programme were sent to France for a course at the CEA laboratories.

A final accord for the venture, financed jointly by the kingdom and France, will be signed within a couple of months, Ganichot said.

One aspect of the programme deals with "reverse osmosis" for desalination, the same process used by Jeddah's mini-water purification plants. Based on the principle of ultra-filtration, the process involves a pressure system.

Chemical experiments have shown that when a container of water separated by a porous panel contains water of different salinity, and pressure is applied to one side of the panel, that side will gradually be filled with water of a higher salt density.

Meanwhile, desalted water will move through the pores of the panel to the opposite, non-pressurized side of the container.

Solar energy is effective with reverse osmosis since a minimal amount of energy is necessary. The process can be used in the kingdom effectively, moreover, because

Saudi Arabia has abundant sunshine as well as the money to finance research for alternative energy sources.

Ganichot points out that France "is a leader in this field," too, thus leading to the cooperative venture.

But this cooperation, as in any field, can be limited by a language barrier. Consequently, France has begun a cultural plan involving two basic parts: language centres and academic cooperation. Three centres — in Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam — will have 12 full-time and 12 part-time instructors.

INSURANCE TRADE HIT BY WAR

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 6 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] LONDON, Wed. — The United Arab Emirates insurance market has lost valuable business through the Gulf conflict, which has cut the once booming re-export trading from Dubai, according to Lloyd's List, the specialist insurance and shipping newspaper here today.

In a report from Abu Dhabi, the newspaper said that no accurate figures for the downturn are available. But the UAE Insurance Association, which represents most of the 6 UAE insurance companies, says the loss was one per cent of the re-export trade.

For the first six months of this year, exports from Dubai were running at around 400 million dirhams.

The newspaper commented, "this is only one of a number of difficulties facing the insurance market in the UAE most stem from sheer weight of numbers — there are too many companies chasing insufficient business."
—Kuna.

CSO: 4820

WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCO PERCEIVES ALGERIAN CHANGE OF ATTITUDE ON SAHARA

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 6 Nov 80 p 8

[Text] Rabat--There is a general feeling in the Moroccan capital, 5 years after the "Green March" of 350,000 Moroccans into former Spanish Sahara, that the conflict which bloodies the region has entered its "final quarter hour."

King Hassan II, who has stated many times in the past year that "1980 will be the year of peace" in the Sahara, can see his efforts coming to fruition. He has declared that Moroccan troops have acquired "total control on the battlefield," while a marked evolution can be noticed in diplomatic activities.

During the 5 war years, the Algerian and Libyan supported POLISARIO has never succeeded in establishing control over any major town or village, nor to secure a strong position in the Western Sahara; even if its vehicles can move unhampered through its rugged and desertic spaces.

This failure of the POLISARIO, particularly in its attempts at securing Smara, has forced it to concentrate the major part of its efforts, for the last year, on the undisputed territories of the Moroccan south, more densely populated and closer to its bases in Tinduf.

This northward shift of the war has incited King Hassan II to draw the Algerian leaders attention to the fact that Moroccan defenders would now have no more reasons not to counterattack into Algerian territory.

Alluding to the catastrophic consequences which could result from an eventual conflict between the two countries, last 10 October as he addressed the Moroccan national assembly, the king stated his "conviction" that POLISARIO's action was "an element of a vast intrigue directed against Morocco and Algeria." These admonishments have been read in Rabat as a public appeal toward Algiers following numerous secret contacts to seek a solution to the conflict.

They have been followed almost immediately, in connection with the earthquake in El Asnam, by concrete signs of improved relations between Rabat and Algiers: condolences message from King Hassan II to President Chadli Benjedid, dispatch of military planes loaded with blankets, food and medical supplies, collection of sheepskins in the Aid Al Adha, to be sold for the benefit of the earthquake victims, and a return message of thanks from the Algerian president. Only a few months ago, such gestures would have been unthinkable; even while King Hassan II had carefully prevented, through the 5 war years, reaching an irremediable break between the two countries.

On the international scene, the Moroccan position has first obtained a victory early in September, at the Wise Men Committee of the OAU meeting in Freeport. Impressed by 10 delegations from Saharouite groups supporting Morocco, the committee has adopted a resolution which ignores the POLISARIO's existence, and which does not require anymore that Moroccan troops should be removed before a referendum is held to decide of self-determination.

In Rabat, there is a perception that the Algerian position has shifted and, in certain political circles, hope is expressed that Algiers could extricate itself completely from the Saharian imbroglio where, as it has always proclaimed, "it has no particular interest to defend."

9627

CSO: 4400

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

Dec 17, 1980